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MAITLAND AS A SOCIOLOGIST

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FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, the grandson of Samuel Maitland, a historian of the Dark Ages who was famous a hundred years ago, was born in 1850 and died at the end of 1906. Educated at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge, he was called to the bar in 1876; but devoting himself to the study of law rather than its practice (as Jeremy Bentham had done before him), he came back to Cambridge in 1884 as Reader of English Law, and in 1888 he was elected Downing Professor of the Laws of England. In the twenty-two years of his teaching and writing in Cambridge, from the age of 34 to the age of 56, he achieved a volume of work, and accumulated a store of influence, which made him one of the great forces of his generation, and indeed a great force to-day. The wonder is all the greater when we reflect that he suffered from ill-health for the greater part of his working life, and, for the last eight years, was regularly compelled to fly to the South every winter. Perhaps the flame burned all the brighter because the vital reserves were always being summoned to feed the wick.

He was primarily a lawyer, or, more exactly, a legal historian. But he interpreted law in that broad and generous sense which makes it the general framework of social life—a framework partly created by the needs and aspirations of

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society, but partly, and in turn, reacting on those needs and aspirations, and helping to determine their form and their development. In this sense it may be said that the study of law was a thing which became in his hands a sociological study. He went beyond legal rules and procedure to the social content of law. Legal history became for him a history of the manor, regarded as a social institution or group; it became a history of township and borough, similarly regarded: it became, at the last, a history of the whole general institution which we call the group or society, in all its various forms.

In the last ten years of his life, from 1896 to 1906, he was more and more fascinated by the problem of the group. In 1897 he published *Domesday Book and Beyond*, in which he dealt with the society of the manor. In the autumn of 1897 I heard him deliver at Oxford, in a voice of which I have never forgotten the magic, some lectures on the societies of Township and Borough, which were published under that title in 1898. He had moved to the general problem of the group at large by 1900. In that year appeared a little volume, *The Political Theories of the Middle Age*, translated from Gierke's German, but armed with an introduction, dealing with what I have called the general problem of the group, which perhaps exerted more influence, if not on legal at any rate on general contemporary thought, than anything else which he wrote. It influenced the thought of Dr. Figgis about the Church; it was cited by the Webbs in the introduction to the 1911 edition of their *History of Trade Unionism*: it was a mine for all who were interested in groups—groups ecclesiastical or groups economic or any manner of group. But the little volume of 1900 was not the only publication of Maitland's last years which bore on this problem. He wrote a number of other essays and articles of which it was also the theme. Some were lectures or papers read to clubs; one was an article contributed to a German legal periodical; two were articles contributed to our own *Law Quarterly*

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Review. They were all collected in the third volume of his *Collected Papers*, which appeared in 1911. They have now been republished in a little volume, under the title of *Selected Essays*, which appeared at the end of last year. If one desires to find the quintessence of "Maitland as a Sociologist," it is to be found in that volume, along with his introduction to *The Political Theories of the Middle Age*.

Before I turn to Maitland's theory of the group, which may be called his specific contribution to sociology, there is something which may properly be said, and indeed must necessarily be said, about the sociological method which he followed in the writing of legal and constitutional history. I have said "the sociological method": I might more exactly, using a prefix of which the lawyers are fond, have said "the quasi-sociological method," intending thereby a method which is not specifically sociological, but is the sort of method, or analogous to the sort of method, which would be used by the sociologist. What I mean is that Maitland interpreted the manor, and feudalism, and the Middle Ages in general, intrinsically and by their own light, as a sociologist would seek to do—not extrinsically and through the spectacles of a later and different age, which is what the historian may do when he is not imbued with a tincture of sociology. This, to my mind, is the difference between Maitland and Stubbs. Great as Stubbs was, he wrote his *Constitutional History of England* in spectacles—the spectacles of Victorian Liberalism, which are all the more curious on his nose when one remembers that he was a natural Tory. Maitland wore no spectacles. He saw the Middle Ages *sub specie temporum suorum*—in the light of their own social conditions and their own stock of social ideas. We may call this gift which he had the gift of sympathetic imagination; but it is more than that—it is the gift of a sympathetic scientific imagination, and the science which inspires the gift is the science of sociology. "To make discoveries," he said, "we must form new habits of mind, and the thoughts of

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men in the past must once more become thinkable to us." This leads me to another of his sayings, which I have never forgotten (though I quote it purely from memory, and therefore probably misquote it), that to understand the Middle Ages we must think ourselves back into a mediæval haze. "Too often," he wrote, in words which express the idea behind that saying with a measured exactitude, "we allow ourselves to suppose that, could we but get back to the beginning, we should find that all was intelligible, and should then be able to watch the process whereby simple ideas were smothered under technicalities and subtleties. But it is not so. Simplicity is the outcome of technical subtlety: it is the goal, not the starting-point. As we go backwards, the familiar outlines become blurred; the ideas become fluid, and instead of the simple we find the indefinite."

This line of thinking and of interpretation brought many revolutions. You will all remember Maine's *Ancient Law* and Maine's theory of the patriarchal origin of society. What has Maitland to say? "Maine's patriarch, who is a trustee, who represents a corporation, looks to me suspiciously modern. He may be a savage, but he is in full evening dress." That is one thing he had to say: and it is devastating. There was also another. He held that there was no one sort of origin, and no one sort of sequence of development. "When this evidence about barbarians gets into the hands of men who . . . have been taught by experience to look upon all the social phenomena as interdependent, it begins to prove far less than it used to prove. Each case begins to look very unique, and a law which deduces that 'mother right' cannot come after 'father right,' or that 'father right' cannot come after 'mother right,' or which would establish any similar sequence of 'states,' begins to look exceedingly improbable." Maitland was deeply convinced of the truth that there was no one line of progress, and that human societies did not grow logically by similar or identical

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processes of immanent development. Societies were interdependent: there was always a process of the diffusion of culture from one society to another: one society, borrowing from another which was an advance of itself, might make a sudden leap which would be inexplicable except in terms of such diffusion and borrowing. "Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the alphabet or at the Nicene Creed by traversing a long series of 'stages': they leapt to the one and the other."

I may seem to have strayed into anthropology, and to have taken Maitland with me in my straying. Let me return to history which is more indubitably history, and let me refer you to Maitland's treatment of feudalism. There are, he says, still some historians who talk of feudalism as if it were a disease of the body politic. Well, no doubt there were some things in the Middle Ages, things properly called feudal, which came of evil and made for evil. But take feudalism by and large; use the term in a wide sense (as a sociologist would); and how does it appear? "If we use the term in this wide sense, then (the barbarian conquests being given to us as an unalterable fact) feudalism means civilization, the separation of employment, a division of labour, the possibility of national defence, the possibility of art, science, literature, and learned leisure; the cathedral, the scriptorium, the library, are as truly the work of feudalism as is the baronial castle." Here is a thing which seems to me well said. It shows how the history of law became in Maitland's hands, as Mr. Fisher has said, "a contribution to the general history of human society." The same lesson appears when we look at his account of one of the institutions of feudalism (in the wide sense of the word), the mediæval manor. How did it come to pass that the villagers followed that curious system of scattered strips in the three great open fields of arable land which surrounded their village dwellings? Had a lord done all this planning and parcelling? Hardly. How would it suit his interest, and how could he induce stubborn

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villagers to accept his ruling? Does it not look as if the body of villagers wanted each member to take the rough with the smooth, and no man to get off better than any other? They did not mind if this made cultivation difficult and diminished their returns. "They sacrificed the cause of efficiency on the altar of equality." There is insight into the nature of man, and especially into the nature of village society, in that epigram.

But it is time that I turned to what I have called Maitland's specific contribution to sociology—his general theory of the group. I have said that the theory of the group was engaging his attention in the last ten years of his life. I always remember one sentence (I think it recurred more than once) in those lectures on *Township and Borough* which I attended in 1897. "Borough community is corporate: village community is not." The question of the nature of corporativeness, if I may use that word, was stirring his mind. What, he was asking himself, is a group or a society of men, at its highest point of identity, when it is somehow one and the plurality of its members is somehow merged into the unity of one body—one *corpus* or corporation? That is a question which you cannot answer without ranging up and down the scale, from the loosest of cohesions to the tightest of corporations. Where does the change come—the magical change that gives you the corporate body? In what does the change consist, and who is it that produces the change? Is it the authority of the State and the fiat of the *princeps*? Or do corporations make themselves, and do they become what they are by their own proper motion?

It was partly the reading of Gierke's great book on the German *Genossenschaft* which had stimulated these questionings. It was partly also some issues which were being raised in this island about 1900. One of them was the Scottish Church case, which began in 1900 and was finally decided by the House of Lords, so far as the law of the matter went, in 1904. This was a case which raised the question of the

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identity of a Church. Another issue was that of the legal position of Trade Unions—the question whether a Trade Union was in any sense corporate and in any way liable therefore to be treated as a single body responsible for its acts and the acts of its agents—which was being raised in the English courts and led to the Taff Vale decision of 1901. But it was not only the reading of Gierke and the nature of contemporary events which stimulated Maitland's mind: it was also the course of his own study. He was dealing with the history of English law and English legal institutions. Now whatever else we may say about England, it has certainly been a paradise of groups. They begin in old Anglo-Saxon frith-gilds (mutual insurance societies, as I should call them, for the safer commission and the surer compensation of cattle-raids), if they are not even earlier than the frith-gilds: they continue, through mediæval religious gilds, mediæval societies of lawyers called Inns of Court, seventeenth-century Free Churches, seventeenth-century East India and other companies, down to modern groups such as Lloyd's, the Stock Exchange, the Trade Union, the London club (such as the Athenæum), and, as I am in private duty bound to mention, this Institute of Sociology which I am now addressing. These riches fascinated Maitland. They may well fascinate any Englishman. How shall we count them, and in what denominations and under what categories shall we classify them?

I have said that these riches fascinated Maitland. He told them over and over, from the far past to the multitudinous present with all its rapid and large increase of corporate or quasi-corporate groups. I cannot do better than quote Mr. Fisher, his brother-in-law and biographer. "Trade Unions and joint-stock companies, chartered boroughs and mediæval universities, village communities and townships, merchant guilds and crafts, every form of association known to mediæval or modern life came within his view, as illustrating the way in which Englishmen attempted 'to

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distinguish and reconcile the manyness of the members and the oneness of the body.' An enquiry of this kind was something entirely new in England." I am not sure if it was entirely new—I remember, for example, Toulmin Smith's book on English Gilds—but it was certainly new in its scope, its zest, and its depth. Perhaps the fact that he was a member of Lincoln's Inn, and had worked in one of the old mediæval English legal societies, still living and active, and (what is more) had studied and written about the achievement of the lawyers who had also worked in these societies in bygone days—perhaps this stimulated his love for the theme of the group. Certainly he had a deep interest in the lawyer-group, which is a peculiar fact of our English life. (At any rate I know of nothing like our Inns of Court in any other country.) There is a lively passage about them, and the men who inhabited them during the Middle Ages, in the introduction which he wrote to a volume of the Year Books. "They are gregarious, clubbable men, grouping themselves in hospices which become schools of law . . . arguing, learning, and teaching, the great mediators between life and logic, a reasoning, reasonable element in the English nation."

A great mediator between life and logic—this is what Maitland himself was, when he dealt with the understanding of the group. The subject suited his own philosophical bent: he had been trained in the Mental and Moral Sciences Tripos, and had taken a first class in that Tripos in 1872. I am not sure that he did not lean too much to logic, at the expense of life, in his interpretation of the group at that highest point of its identity at which it becomes a corporation. He was affected by Gierke's theory: he thought that a corporation was a real person. He believed that the change which was reached in the scale of group-being, when you come to the corporation, was the emergence of a new person, with a mind and will of its own; and he believed that this person was real—as real, unless I am mistaken, as you and I are real. I cannot follow that interpretation; but I will

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not go into the reasons which hold me back from following. I have tried to explain them elsewhere.¹ Here I will only say that real group-persons terrify me, but leave me still a sceptic. When I am told, for instance, that the nation "is an organism, with a being, ends, and means of action superior to those of the individuals, separate or grouped, who compose it" (and that is what I am told in the Italian Charter of Labour of 1927), I can only say that that is not what a nation is, or ever can be, to me. The group at its highest, when it almost seems to merge plurality into unity, is still to me so many individual human beings. What raises it to its highest is not the emergence of a real new personality, over and above the personalities of its members: it is simply the height or quality of the common purpose which individual persons agree in holding and willing—the width, the depth, and the permanence of that purpose. Purpose is all; and it is by their purposes that I should judge, range, classify, and also criticize, groups.

Having said these words, and having implied, as I confess that I have, that Maitland seems to me to have over-exalted the being of the corporate group, and to have contributed, in some measure, to the group-cult of our days (not that it is so marked in England as it is elsewhere), I now pass on—very gladly, and with far more zest in agreement than I have in my disagreement—to say some words about Maitland's contribution to the general understanding of our English groups and societies. There are two things which I wish to say. One concerns the idea of the group—and more particularly the corporate group, the group which acts as a single body or *corpus*, 'and moveth altogether if it move at all'—as it acts in the sphere of our national politics, or, in other words, in the sphere of the State. The other concerns the idea of the group—the group generally, corporate or unincorporate, whether it moves with the oneness of the body or the manyness of the members—as it

¹ *Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, translated from Gierke, 1934.

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acts in the sphere of our social life, or, in other words, in the sphere of Society.

In the sphere of our politics we have long had one idea of a corporation which seemed to Maitland curious, and indeed unfortunate. This is the idea of the king as a corporation sole, a corporation with only one member, to wit, himself. I would not necessarily dismiss altogether this idea of the corporation sole, curious as it may seem—though I do not like it in its particular application to the king. I have met and stayed with a corporation sole in Massachusetts—Dr. Lawrence Lowell, who is a corporation sole in respect of the Lowell Lectures, of which he holds the funds and for which he makes the arrangements. That corporation sole invited me to lecture, and paid me a generous remuneration: I have no quarrel with it. But I feel differently, taught by Maitland, about the idea of the king as a corporation sole. Dr. Lawrence Lowell, as a corporation sole, has not got into the way of anything else. He has not stopped the emergence of some other and truer idea of a corporation in the same sphere in which he is one. The idea of the king as a corporation sole *has* got into the way of something else. It has stopped the emergence—or rather not stopped, but blurred and confused the emergence—of the great and true idea that all the people of England, as members of one body, including the king their head, and carrying the king on their shoulders with them, are the true and only corporation of England in the sphere of politics. This is not Republicanism (the king is still there as head of the body): it is good old mediæval theory, and it was a theory still known to our lawyers in the sixteenth century. A Chief Justice was declaring in 1522, “A corporation is an aggregation of head and body: not a head by itself nor a body by itself; and it must be, consonant to reason, for otherwise it is worth naught.” That is good sense; and it is a pity that it was ever forgotten, and that the king became a corporation sole, or ‘head by itself.’ It caused a good deal of trouble; and

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it is still causing trouble to-day. When I see the king, in the change lately made in the Coronation Oath, made to speak about "My possessions," I see that the corporation sole, or head by itself, is still floating about. And I murmur to myself that any possessions, any rights, any duties, in the sphere of our national politics, really appertain and belong to a corporation aggregate, of which you and I are members along with the king our head—not we alone, nor he alone, but all of us together. That is the true political corporation—the true owner of the possessions, rights, and duties common to the people; and if a word is wanted for it, the right word, as Maitland said (and it is a good old sixteenth-century word), is the word Commonwealth. It is a word which has been borrowed for the Empire, to which, I venture to think, it does not really belong. The Empire is not a commonwealth, but a number of allied and kindred commonwealths. And one of these commonwealths is the commonwealth of this island.

It is in the sphere of social life, and in regard to the groups, corporate or unincorporate, which move in that sphere, that Maitland has, I think, taught us most. There is a word or term morphology which Goethe, I believe, introduced into science. It is defined as a branch of biology which is concerned with the form of animals and plants, and with the factors which govern or influence that form. Using that word, I should say that Maitland was a master of social morphology. He studied the forms of society, in mediæval, modern, and contemporary times, and he studied the factors (above all the legal factors) which have governed or influenced, or are governing or influencing, these forms. The great factor which he studied was the English law of Trust. A trust, I may remind you, is in its origin (it begins in 1400 or thereabouts) a legal act by which a landowner, tied by the law of primogeniture, contrives to release some of his property, and to vest it in trustees who will hold it in trust, to the use and for the benefit of his younger sons and his

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daughters. Very good, you will say, but what has that got to do with social morphology or with the growth of societies? Very much, Maitland will tell us: at any rate in England and so far as English law is concerned. As the law of Trust develops, it is found that a growing society can take advantage of it as easily as the solitary dying landowner. The members of a society collect subscriptions; they vest them in a permanent body of trustees, who can always be renewed by fresh election or by simple co-optation; the trustees hold the subscriptions, and any other funds or property, to the use and for the benefit of the society; and lo and behold, the society is a going concern, with the necessary buildings, and the necessary general resources, for the achievement of the common purpose by which it is held together. The society needs no incorporation, which might put it at the mercy of the State, since the State might refuse to grant it: it only needs to "trustify" itself, which it can do by going to any lawyer, and when it has done that it can trust the Lord Chancellor, who sees to the observance of trusts, to keep the trustees in order. In this way, as Maitland showed, and showed by a wealth of examples, the trust has been with us, for the last three or four hundred years, a great "instrument of social experimentation." It has been a dominant factor in the history of our social morphology. The Free Churches have availed themselves of it; Trade Unions have availed themselves of it; commercial and industrial companies have availed themselves of it; clubs, literary and philosophical societies, whatever you like, have all availed themselves of it. The pulsation of social life has caught at a legal instrument, and used it, "by kind permission" of the law, for the achievement of its own objects. That reminds me of a saying of Maitland, which I think is apposite. "The one thing that it is safe to predict is that in England social-political will take precedence of jurisprudential considerations." In other words, we let the growth of English society catch at our law, mould our law,

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use our law for its purposes. Blessings on the law which has been so amenable. Blessings above all on the law of Trust, which has listened so readily to social persuasion. We owe to it more than we know.

We owe to it, for example, a great deal of our religious and what I may call our economic liberty. Where would Free Churches and Trade Unions have been if it had not been for our law of Trust? It is difficult to imagine the answer, or to detect the dim and dusty retreat to which they might otherwise have been condemned. Wesleyans owe much to John Wesley: they also owe something to the Lord Chancellor. It was in firm reliance on the Lord Chancellor that John Wesley set his seal, in 1784, to a document declaring the trusts on which he held certain lands and buildings in various parts of England. That document secured the Wesleyan Church in the free and unfettered, yet guaranteed, enjoyment of all its scattered chapels and their various funds. It is natural for Maitland to say, reflecting on these facts, "All that we English people mean by religious liberty has been intimately connected with the making of trusts." If by religious liberty we mean not merely the liberty of the individual, but the liberty of the religious society, and if we realize that a religious society, in order to possess liberty, must be free to own and control its buildings and its funds, we shall readily see that religious liberty is closely connected with the law of Trust. The trust was a screen behind which a religious society could lie perdu, in unmolested security; or again, to use another of Maitland's metaphors, it was a back-stair—a blessed wide back-stair—up which religious society could climb to the height of being corporate (or shall I say "quasi-corporate?" at any rate corporate enough for every practical purpose) without needing to be incorporated.

What protected the Free Churches, and indeed any Church that sought the protection, was ready to protect also the Trade Union. Trade Unions owe much to many brave labour leaders: they also owe something, just like the

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Wesleyans, to the Lord Chancellor. Nor need we stop at them. The whole general history of our social morphology is intertwined with the trust. "Behind the screen of trustees, and concealed from the direct scrutiny of legal theories, all manner of groups can flourish: Lincoln's Inn, or Lloyd's, or the Stock Exchange, or the Jockey Club, a whole Presbyterian system, or even the Church of Rome with the Pope at its head." . . . "So wide was that blessed back-stair."

But I must come to an end. If I try to summarize the chief idea, which I want to leave in your minds, I should do so in this way. Sociology runs into law, and is intertwined with the concepts of the lawyers. We should have societies without lawyers; but the forms which societies take are largely dependent on the boxes which lawyers provide for their reception and incubation. Our English law has provided a generous box; and that has helped the germination of our English societies. But the interesting thing about the box which is called Trust is that it was not provided for societies. It was provided, as we have seen, for something else; but the box which the lawyers made for something else was found by societies, and turned by them (of course with the aid and connivance of the lawyers) to another purpose—the purpose of social experimentation. A most interesting thing, as I say; and it leads us on to reflect upon another interesting thing. The Marxists say that the interest of a dominant social class precipitates law, and precipitates it in its own favour. Does it? The story which Maitland tells shows, indeed, that the interest of the feudal landowner originally precipitated the law of trust; but it also shows another thing—that the law thus precipitated ultimately came to serve a very different and a vastly greater social interest, the interest of little struggling village chapels and of striving and fighting Trade Unions. Now a Marxist would admit that a law once precipitated for one purpose may come incidentally, by acquiring a sort of independent life, to serve other purposes. But will that admission cover the story which Maitland tells?

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Hardly. A law which in the great range of its application, for the last three or four centuries, has served purposes almost the opposite of those of its origin, at any rate in so far as class-interest is concerned, is a law which cannot be explained by the principle of class-interest. Class-interest may have started it; but it has escaped from the interest which started it, and run magnificently wild. The growth of our English society, the poor as well as the rich, has poured itself into this box of trust. The law of Trust has been impartially accommodating: it has aided equally the growth of different social interests, or, if it has aided any one interest particularly, it has aided particularly the interest of the poor. Anyhow, it has aided, as Maitland says, the general process of social experimentation. That is a great thing, perhaps the greatest of all things, if you believe, as I do, that the process of social experimentation is prior to the State, is greater than the State, and must be served and preserved by the State.

We may therefore thank Maitland, with a deep gratitude, for the light he has shed on the social growth of our people. Perhaps it is also a light on the normal growth of all peoples. Perhaps we may even add that it is a light which should guide future growth. Free social experimentation—in the field of religious life, which cries aloud to-day for such ventures; in the field of economic life, which knows no panacea but demands every experiment of remedy—free social experimentation . . . what can be greater?

THE SOCIAL, SPIRITUAL,¹ AND CULTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE INTERHUMAN LIFE

By LEOPOLD VON WIESE

I

THE definition of the task of sociology as a science may be stated in one quite simple and short phrase, namely: The demonstration of the social elements in human life. "Demonstration" here implies, firstly, to set forth the many basic forces that through their interplay produce the manifestations of the social; and secondly, to indicate the associated effects of the social. "Human life" includes both the life of individual men and the life of collectivities of men.

But what are the "social elements"? This cardinal question, "What is the social?" is the essential and specific problem of sociology considered as a systematic science. By that problem sociology is distinguished from all other sciences, which for their part set themselves other cardinal questions. If everyone concerned in sociological studies accepted these limitations, while comprehending to the full the scope and abundance of the tasks involved in the interpretation of the social, we should be much nearer the completion of a work whose theoretical importance and practical utility cannot be too highly valued. One might think that this cannot be so difficult a task and might indeed already have been undertaken. But the reverse is the case. Evil spirits, whose vocation is to stir up mental confusion, seem

¹ It is a difficult question whether the German words *Geist* and *geistig*, used in the same sense as Sombart and other modern sociologists regard them, are better translated by *spirit* and *spiritual* or *mind* and *mental* or *intellect* and *intellectual*. This can be decided only if the half-mystical and more or less metaphysical meaning combined with their use is duly considered. Then we see that the words *intellect* and *intellectual* are inadequate, also, though in a lesser degree, *mind* and *mental*; therefore I preferred *spirit* and *spiritual*.

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to cast a spell. The purpose of making the social intelligible is too often altered to other purposes. In the consciousness of scholars the social seems to assume another shape with the greatest ease, and this shape they pursue without knowing they have gone astray.

First of all, then, it is necessary to say quite simply what the term "social" means—and particularly what it does *not* mean. Another word having the same sense is "interhuman." What is implied in the significant preposition "inter"? Hence arise these questions : firstly, what comes out of the coherence of men, with its relations of association and dissociation? And secondly, how does this positive and negative coherence come about?

To understand what follows it is indispensable that the mind should be kept free from all the accessory conceptions so often implied by the term "social," and particularly to avoid the narrow, ethical meaning of the term. "Social" is simply interhuman in all its aspects, thought of as a fact, not as a norm; a sociological category freed from every implication of value and applicable to both the smallest and largest coherences.

It is most important that we should avoid making the social equivalent to certain other categories. This demand that we ought to make of ourselves is most exacting, yet it is the most frequently and completely ignored. Even where such equivalencies are not suggested in the first instance, the inclination later appears to derive the social from other categories and thus to deprive it of its independence and special character. Sociology is then reduced to a mere appendage of that science from which the social is derived.

The deepest degradation of the social takes place when its position as a basic force in human life is considered to be a mere fiction or a simplifying assumption which evaporates as soon as we try to seize it. Then the interhuman element disappears in favour of other forces, e.g. in favour of individual human forces. Then it is asserted : "All that is of

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importance in human life, e.g. that which we call culture, rises not from the interhuman sphere but directly from human souls and bodies." The interhuman sphere which is truth is not visible or otherwise perceptible, is said not to exist: the only reality is the individual human bodies. Sociology therefore disappears in favour of anthropology.

The student, however, who has not the will or power to deny the structure and processes of the interhuman sphere often shows, as we have said, the inclination to change the interhuman into a special manifestation of human coherence. We may here disregard explanations belonging to the sphere of the natural sciences, such as attempts to give purely physical and chemical interpretations. We are, however, concerned with :

- (1) The equivalence of social and vital events (sociology then becomes a branch of biology).
 - (2) The confusion of the social with that which has developed historically (sociology then becomes systematized history).
 - (3) The equivalence of the social with certain phenomena of the psychic life (sociology then becomes social psychology or physio-psychology).
 - (4) The equivalence of the social with the spiritual (whereby a distinction is made between mind and spirit and, as a rule, manifestations of an objective world spirit, whose existence becomes a necessary metaphysical supposition, and is taken for granted).
 - (5) The equivalence of the social with the cultural (sociology then becomes the science of culture).
- Two other equivalencies must be mentioned to complete the list:
- (6) The equivalence of sociology and political theory ; in other words, everything social is political.
 - (7) The equivalence of sociology and ethics (sociology then becomes not a science of that which is, but of that which ought to be).

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We must regard these confusions as the greatest hindrances to the development of our science because they lead away from the right road, into a foreign region. Unless scholars have a clear idea of this danger they may, sooner or later, fall under the attraction of the well-beaten and centuries-old paths of the elder sciences.

We must deny the identity of sociology with any one of the neighbouring disciplines above enumerated, while admitting the existence of correlations and parallelism. There may sometimes seem to be only a fine borderline, but the decisive point is that the central and essential questions are different. In this paper we are concerned with the problem so far as it is involved in the relation between the social and the spiritual or cultural.

To bring out the point, we may imagine two scholars discussing the problems of sociology, and frequently using the term "social," and seeming at first to give it the same sense, while later some uncertainty arises. Finally A asks B: "What exactly do you mean by 'social'?" B replies: "I mean the relation between men that is peculiar to them. This relation is not merely the physical relation existing in the inorganic world, nor yet merely the physico-psychic relation existing in the realm of plants and animals. It is a spiritual relation. Men are held together corporeally, psychically, and, in so far as they are human beings, also spiritually. We might even say they are combined artificially, not naturally."

This answer is an example of the narrowing of the field of interhuman coherence. Social coherence is made identical with spiritual coherence. The questioner A, who thinks differently, may respond: "I refuse to identify the social with the spiritual. They are different aspects of human life: some spiritual elements are found in the social, but many more non-spiritual elements. Not seldom spiritual and social are discordant: the social hinders the spirit and the spirit avoids the closely integrated thought of interhuman life.

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Perhaps what man has in common with animals is a closer social coherence rather than spirit."¹

Speaker A would here be setting out the view advocated in this paper. That view, however, does not deny the influence of the *Weltgeist* in human society throughout its history. We do not deny the significance of mental and cultural elements and supersede them by a materialistic interpretation of history. The degree to which social institutions are intellectualized is a valuable study for the philosopher or cultural historian. It is clear to us, however, that to attempt to dissolve the social completely into spiritual or cultural elements is fatal. It is fatal in theory, because it leaves the special character of the social unexplained, and it is fatal practically because political or private actions based upon such a confusion of thought must increase suffering in the world.

II

The identification of the social with the spiritual may have two different meanings, according to whether or not a distinction is made between spirit and soul. In the first case spiritual coherence is non-psychic. In the second case spirit is looked on as equivalent to the subjective activity of thinking. Here the social is interpreted psychologically, and a preponderant or even exclusive part in bringing about interhuman coherence is attributed to the intellect. However, in the first case an objective spirit is supposed to exist, and here again there are two possibilities.

(1) The expressions of spirit, and therefore the relations in which men are spiritually related, may be given the widest extension imaginable. Compare Sombart's saying: "It reaches from the Boxers' Club to the Academy, from the family to the State, from the warehouse to the religious

¹ This reply is a quotation of a passage in Werner Sombart's Academy paper: *Sociology—what it is and what it ought to be*. (Berlin, 1936, published in commission for the Academy of Sciences by Walter de Gruyter and Co.)

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brotherhood; in short, it encircles the whole being of men."

(2) You may see the manifestations of spirit only in the most abstract and highest social structures, particularly in the State, as Hegel did.

The contrast between the two principal connotations of the spiritual has nothing to do with sociological theory. It belongs to the field of anthropology, or to that of philosophy and psychology, and touches also that of metaphysical doctrine. (To enter into these questions would divert us from our theme and is, indeed, unnecessary, because we consider both the implied doctrines false.) Let us, however, glance at the implications of both. Take first the idea that the social is the immediate result of human thinking in such a manner that analysis of the intellectual faculty also reveals the principal phenomena of the interhuman. The idea might be summed up by changing Descartes' famous sentence, "*Cogito ergo sum*" (I think therefore I am) into the sentence, "Social coherence is the result of process of thinking." Even if we admit for the sake of argument that human coherence is a purely psychic phenomenon and derived from psychic processes, it would still be a mistake to give special prominence to the connective power of thinking. Sentiments, instincts, and passions form positive and negative elements of socialization which are not less strong—are, indeed, much stronger—than thinking. (This, if nothing else, may be learnt from Pareto.) Groups with *conscious* aims and plans and forms of intercourse dependent upon common interests certainly play a great part in modern life. But, using Tönnies' terms, the *Gesellschaften* (associations or societies) thus created are found side by side with *Gemeinschaften* (communities). Even if this rather controversial antithesis between social structures is not accepted there can be no doubt that the whole inner life, down to the purely animal sensations and the simplest instincts and up to the deepest religious emotions and most artistic ecstasies, influences interhuman coherence. The significance of ideas and

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ideologies for social life must by no means be neglected, but these factors themselves are never mere products of thinking but results of the whole psychic life. They are even less under the control of strict thinking than is generally supposed. Herein they are, like conceptions and thought-systems, useful for tasks other than social ones.

To the spirit, interpreted as the intellect, therefore, we may not attribute exclusive importance. But what of the psychic life, considered as completely unified? Here we face the much-discussed question of the relations between psychology and sociology about which during the last decades errors have been piling up. It may suffice to say that the term social embraces all forces or factors causing approach or avoidance between men: therefore not only psychic or physical human powers are covered by it. The social is quite a special blend, embodying not only psychic or physical human elements, but also non-human elements in connexion with the human. Even the most penetrating study of human psychic life does not afford sufficient insight into the phenomena of social space. The cross-section drawn by the psychologist through the complexes of human life is not the same as that of the sociologist. The first, indeed, also collects observations of external events, but only to gain from them knowledge of the *inner* life. He is interested in external events *only* in so far as material may be extracted therefrom to answer the question: What is the soul?

For the sociologist the question is just the opposite. His proper field of study is the realm of *occurrences between men*. Social facts are not events in the inward life of souls. Social facts come to pass in social space. This is, indeed, not the same as physical space, but like that it is a field of facts, i.e. thoughts of conscious and unconscious actions projected into the physical world. Sentiments or thoughts that do not become deeds have no place in the specifically real world of the social. It is true that psychic forces are the chief causative factors in the interhuman life; they are, however, not

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social itself but only one of its elements. This can be demonstrated most clearly by a comparison of this psychic inner phenomenon with the social external worlds. If there were a total and pure dependence of the interhuman upon the psychic, the social processes would follow a course corresponding to the preceding images in the soul. That, however—to take only one point—does not and cannot happen, because in each interhuman process several men take a part, and each of these persons has formed his own image different from that of the others of the expected events.

Simple social happenings, e.g. a conference, a trial, a confession, may be analysed to show how that which actually happens (i.e. which can be controlled by a third observing person) is a different thing from that which precedes and accompanies it in the souls of the persons concerned. You become aware of the great differences between the soul-images and the actual happenings. To verify this actual existence of interhuman coherence and effective change in it is the task of the sociologist. He is the third person observing changes in the social sphere, and not wishing to answer the question, "What is the soul?" but "What happens in the relationship of man to man?" His realm consists in his conception of social space as an objectively given reality, an "*Ausser-Ich*" (outside of self), and in his not confusing this kind of reality with the mere psychic inner reality.

III

In all countries there are writers who believe that they are expounding sociology by analysing and comparing those powers of the soul (especially sentiments) which are concerned with the coherence of men. Such are, for instance, the sentiments and striving associated with domination, submissiveness, obedience, sympathy, etc. Many others try to build up a system of motives, and, in the better examples, they look for the active manifestations of such motives.

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But even so, they certainly do not reach the field of events. They are taking only the first, though important and necessary, steps on one of the roads leading into the field of social facts. We do not advise the closing of this entrance from the soul to the field of action, but urge that from the first it should be realized how all these impulses leading from the psychic to the social suffer manifold fragmentation, extinction, strengthening, and change by influences from the external world.

In practice, a dissolution of sociology into psychology must be followed by mistakes of lasting effect. We should then study and influence the souls of men, in the belief that thereby we could know and control happenings in social space.

In education, in politics, in the Army, in economic organization, and the like, one cannot reach the end without psychology, but one cannot reach it with psychology alone. That which must interest the theoretical investigator is of no interest to the practitioner: only that which is carried over from the psychic sphere into the social sphere is important to him. To know and to influence this space of the inter-human world with all its psychic and non-psychic contents and its mixture of both—that is the point.

IV

We now turn to that interpretation of the spiritual which is said to have nothing in common with psychology. Here the spiritual is not a subjective force inherent in the inner life of men, but a divine power transcending human experience and manifesting itself as the *Weltgeist* in the history of mankind, using the social structures as vessels for its manifestations. According to this interpretation, our task would be to discover this objective spiritual power in the collectivities of men. That would be the purpose of sociology.

To deny that the social is one and the same as the spiritual may not mean to deny God. It means to doubt that God's

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will and ways can be recognized in the social order created by men in such a manner that we must make the science of society equivalent to the knowledge of divinity. Even if we believe that the hand of the world spirit can be perceived everywhere in the social history of mankind, we can only dare to say that either "God's will is always manifesting itself anew in spite of man's incapacity and errors," or "Sometimes an effort by men to find a place for superhuman powers within their social order may be recognized." All this is a subject of social philosophy or of religious ethics, but has nothing to do with a realistic sociology, having reference to everyday life and resting upon sensual observations. Further, we encounter this kind of spirit only when we meditate about the highest and most abstract collectivities. States, Churches, cultural unions, etc., sometimes strive for spiritualization. Looked at realistically, however, they are without exception only forms of socialization, the contents of which may be infinitely different. Extending from plainly primitive and instinctively built structures to ideal orders, they can develop towards the *Weltgeist* or they can go away from it.

A conception of social structure under which the coherence existing under such structures is of spiritual origin cannot be defended unless we give the word *spiritual* a quite empty sense. However we may interpret the word *spiritual*, there are always deficiencies and extortions if we equalize it with *social*.

In this statement a contradiction of Sombart's Noo-Sociology is involved. His thesis, "All society is spirit and all spirit is society," has its origin in Comte's social philosophy. It is false. We may imagine what fatal consequences would follow from it if practices were regulated by it, by such a rule as : "Every phenomenon in the realm of human society is determined by spirit." On earth the striving soul of some individuals is and remains the only home of spiritual forces. Society is not capable of absorbing much from them.

However, a more or less optimistic or pessimistic view of

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society and spirit is not the point. (Sombart and Pareto are the greatest contrasts I know in this respect.) More remarkable is this conclusion: that alone is good sociology where the conceptions social, spiritual, and cultural—to add here this third element, cultural, which is closely allied to spiritual—are separated from each other. If we make the social equivalent to the other two forms, only a totally wrong image of the interhuman sphere can result. And if practical and, for example, political principles are based upon this doctrine, suffering in the world must greatly increase in consequence of this fundamental lack of truth.

To play dangerously with the word *spirit* in an obscure half-mystical manner is, I regret to say, a German peculiarity. It is done in order to emphasize an opposition to the idea of comprehending social life from the standpoint of natural science. These altogether spiritualistic people find it unbearable to study the natural facts in the interhuman sphere, however attractive and important. They are very busy "extirpating the last traces of naturalistic thinking." They do not, however, extinguish these traces, but only the last traces of clarity in their own thinking.

V

To make social and cultural equivalent is an international defect that may be found to-day in America as frequently as in Europe. In particular the sociological school of the Evolutionists shows a tendency to change their studies of the growth of social structures into a statement of the achievements of these structures. They would like to demonstrate progress as clearly discernible in the results of human productivity. It is especially where a demand for valuation is dominant that history or the science of culture arises without difficulty out of sociology. Then culture and civilization appear as the important subjects, both envisaged correctly enough as results of interhuman life. Society is thought of

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as giving rise to culture, and therefore they think the study of society becomes the study of culture.

A sublime and attractive task, but there is much lack of clearness here, for conceptions as to what should be included under culture, and what not, differ widely. If by culture you understand, as we do, all refinements of natural existence, and you study the coherence of such refinements with the group-life of men, this is one of the most fascinating tasks that the scholar can undertake. But just because of this the sociologist ought to offer resistance to the implied replacement of his proper task by another.

What is the difference? The science of culture deals with the products of social life. Sociology, on the contrary, does not study products but producers. It does not teach how men as individuals or in groups have subjugated the world of things, but how they behave or have behaved to one another. Some conclusions may certainly be reached from the man-*thing* relationship, and therefore very often cultural achievements and their history may be included as material or evidence. But for the sociologist this indirect significance of mere things does not elevate them to be the principal object of study.

Here, again, the danger does not lie in the consideration of a non-sociological subject, but in the consequent neglect of the other task and the attempt to perform that by misrepresenting the science of culture as sociology. The consequence is that the special theme of sociology becomes forgotten and excluded. This alone is what we protest against.

Perhaps it may be objected that our definition of culture is too wide and too materialistic—that culture is not only, or not at all, civilization or the domination of things, but just refinement of relationships between men. Culture may appear as social culture, and thereby two different conceptions may become possible: first, you may make cultural the equivalent of spiritual—then, all that has been opposed to the thesis: "Society is spirit and spirit is society," may also

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be opposed to the statement: "Society is culture and culture is society." A new idol is erected, no longer called spirit but culture. Or again you may try to approach sociology by interesting yourself in the interhuman life, but choosing from it arbitrarily some things which you value so much that you regard and investigate only these. You therefore put aside other matters that are perhaps mean and unrefined but still are important parts of the social reality. Again, therefore, the image of society arising from such a conception is untrue. The sociologist is never free to choose according to a pre-conceived state of values. His inevitable omissions arise from the necessities of a working economy, and not from ideas of value such as culture implies.

Further, a doctrine of culture which judges values according to the strength of the sympathy between men or to similar social ideas is social ethics. It belongs to the science of that which ought to be. Finally, a doctrine of culture seeking the dismembering of the course of historical evolution into cultural phases, or the total culture of the earth into spatial regions, is history (philosophy of history or cultural geography or geo-politics).

VI

Now we come back to our main question. What are the interhuman elements if they are not identical with the psychic, the spiritual, and the cultural ones? What is the subject of sociology? True, it does not deal with the study of the human body, nor with the study of the human soul, nor with the human spirit. It does deal with the influences of men and collectivities of men on one another. Its great theme is man as *socius*. The observation that men, being *socii*, form groups or withdraw from existing groupings is its most important fact. In studying the living together of men we have to consider all forces engendering coherence or avoidance between men. While, on the other hand, we have

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to meditate upon nothing else but just upon those forces and their effects.

There is no other way of studying the social elements than to observe the main types of occurrences in the interhuman life and to ascertain by analysis the causative forces at work, with the result that psychic bodily and spiritual elements are seen to be related in varied mixtures with extra-human natural elements. And also personal with group elements, old with new, organized with unorganized, material with ideal, and so on. Since his youth the writer has striven to perform this task by developing a systematic theory of the social processes and social structures of men.¹ There are, however, authors of the above-mentioned schools who assert that such an object of study does not exist. Sombart at least has said so in a paper read before the Prussian Academy of Sciences. There he rejects six trends in sociology and among them our sociology of relationships. He raises objections to calling this sociology formal, in which I quite agree. But I put this aside as insignificant. Then Sombart continues: "But more important is the absolute objection that on closer inspection the object of formal sociology does not exist at all. Such an isolation of a distinct part from a complex phenomenon as is brought about through an isolating abstraction is, in my opinion, entirely inadmissible in the realm of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. One cannot here isolate relationships as one may, e.g. in the fact of movement from bodies and make them the object of a particular science. One cannot do this, because every phenomenon in the realm of human society is spiritually and consequently defined by quality. Every correlation derives its character and consequently its shape only from a spiritual relationship without which it is a natural, not a social, fact. There is no honour, no jealousy, which is not embedded in a distinct spiritual

¹ Cf. L. v. Wiese, *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie*, 2nd ed., München u. Leipzig, 1933 (Duncker and Humblot), or *Systematic Sociology*, based on *Beziehungstheorie und Gebildetheorie* of Leopold v. Wiese, adapted and amplified by Howard Becker. New York, 1932 (John Wiley and Sons).

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atmosphere. No group, no crowd, about which it would be possible to make general statements of a sociological nature. To grasp an occurrence sociologically it must always be asked: "In which collectivity—of familial, political, religious, purposeful, type, and so on—is it happening?" But a collectivity is always determined by its spiritual contacts. Obviously in formal sociology we have to do with the last remnant of natural science thinking. Whoever considers this as unsuitable for comprehending human society will, therefore, be obliged to regard formal sociology as an unsuccessful attempt, although it may have been worked out with great intellectual power.

VII

But we now come to the important question: "Is there a possibility of isolating the interhuman from the total complex of experienced human reality?" We must first clear up another point. What is it that sociology must consider in an isolated form, and how far does that isolation reach? It is true that a study of the social as a part of the human field cannot be undertaken except through isolating abstraction. This applies also in the study of the spiritual or the cultural. There, too, no other way exists. For each systematic science the thesis that its object does not exist in a distinct and separate way must be admitted. In other words, that the cross-section isolated for scientific purposes and dissociated from the whole cannot be experienced. On the other hand, the totality of practical experiences cannot be taken as the object of one science. In contrast to the systematic sciences, indeed, history tries to register concrete experiences. As soon, however, as it begins to explain these, even history has to simplify things by omissions and so to approach to the isolating method of the systematized disciplines such as sociology.

All concrete experiences are disordered, piles of numberless

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ingredients, not accessible to logically ordered investigation unless we begin by enquiring whether they contain this or that element in them. Further, we have to demonstrate similar elements in other experiences and to establish an intelligible coherence between these distinct ingredients of numerous experiences. We may never assume that we can grasp rationally in this way the totalities of concrete experience.

The social does exist in human life just as much and as little as the spiritual, psychic, or cultural. When we draw the image of reality in the scientific style, omissions are always to be found. Without abstraction life cannot be explained. Only by abstraction can we verify this or that systematically. The main point is that we constantly put forward to reality only one distinct, clearly defined question. We do not mingle this question with other questions, and we try to extract from an abundance of suitable objects all that is required to get our answer. The same objects may also be investigated by another science, but then other matters are in question. There is no science that can pretend alone and in its own right to explain reality throughout. Each science always explains only something taken out of reality.

In sociology we try to set forth those elements of human life which can only be reduced to coherence between men. When this point is fully realized we can further show that the difficulties of such an abstraction are not greater or less than those which arise when we isolate any other homogeneous complex of elements. We have to analyse occurrences of human life in which more than one person is taking part, and in doing so to ask what in their process is to be reduced to the influence of one man on the other, or of the individual on the collectivity, and so on. In the professional terms of science we have to analyse and systematize the social processes as such.

If we consider, as Sombart does, a single social process (for instance, an occurrence of jealousy or crowding) in

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respect of its actual coherence—of its “ embeddedness in a distinct spiritual atmosphere ”—we are perceiving it historically, not sociologically. The sociological question is, on the other hand, what speciality of positive or negative coherence is given in an occurrence, and how can this speciality be fitted into a more general type of association or dissociation.

VIII

With the question whether the isolation of the interhuman is possible is closely linked the other question as to the fertility of this method. Can we, starting from our point of view, reach essentials, or do we get nothing but a superficially ordered “ catalogue of social phenomena,” nothing but senseless classifications and external coherences?

In reply it is difficult not to adopt the pathetic style of the psalmist and declaim poetically how the fate of one man is bound up with that of other men. We cannot believe that in this epoch which has been named “ the social age ” people should be unable to realize that the demonstration of the approach and the avoidance of men is the most dramatic, most alive, and most exciting object set before any scientist. Sophocles, Aristophanes, Shakespeare, and Goethe stand godfathers to such a science.

It is true that the process of ordering into main categories only puts the facts in order, but everyone who knows the dangers of confusion and the lack of clearness in our field ought to see how necessary is this first “ superficial ” task. Simple explanatory, apparently superficial, categories must form the secure framework of the system. These must not worry readers or hearers by having the appearance of enigmas in thinking.

However, the categories are not the most essential factors: they are unavoidable working tools. There may be readers who think that we do not gain much when, for example, we observe the soldiers in an army practising partly processes

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of approach, partly processes of avoidance, partly mixed processes.¹ More essential, indeed, is the insight (which can be attained by investigating the play of changing coherences) that the social sphere, in which we act on other men and are acted on by them, may be considerably different from the internally experienced world. Equally essential is the insight that of the desires, apprehensions, and strivings of men only a part is realized, and that part, indeed, in a manner different from that anticipated. And, further, that only in definite situations which the individual alone cannot produce do such realizations occur; in short, that the social world is another world from the individual sphere. Not merely to suppose and to understand in Sombart's sense, but to reveal the laws to be inferred from such deviations—that is an essential and rational task. To reduce this special kind of facts to dismembered spiritual entities does not bring us one step further.

It is an impressive task to plunge into the depths of this interhuman distance. Is it possible that one really cannot see that it is an object that "exists"?

¹ Cf. Wilhelm Andreae, "*Gegenstand und Verfahren der Gesellschaftslehre*," *Zeitschrift f. d. gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, Bd. XCVI, Heft 3.

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND ASSIMILATION¹

By C. BOUGLE

I. DIFFERENTIATION

ARE men becoming more and more different? Or more and more alike? What forms do this differentiation and assimilation take? On the whole, is the former gaining ground or the latter?

Doubtless these are very general questions. But it is no bad thing that sociology, if it wishes to preserve its *raison d'être*, should continue to ask general questions, provided that in order to answer them it is all the time engaged in exact researches. Monographs directed towards syntheses are the condition necessary for the progress of our discipline.

Further, syntheses seem to be themselves preludes necessary for action. In order to choose with sufficient understanding between two courses, the view one has of the dominant tendencies in human history is not without importance. In the question we have asked, it is at once clear that according to the answer given, avenues may be opened or closed to moral rationalism. Moral rationalism leads naturally on the one hand to democracy and on the other to internationalism; it tends towards an order which, not only within nations but also in relations between nations, would respect, and cause to be respected, the equal rights of all parties. But an order of this kind presupposes men who are more and more capable of understanding one another, of accepting a certain set of values; in short, assimilable beings.

It is not necessary to look very far to find a philosophy which seems to be opposed point by point to these expectations. We are immediately reminded of Herbert Spencer,

¹This article is a résumé of two lectures delivered at the London School of Economics on February 19 and February 22, 1937. M. Bouglé is not responsible for the translation.

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author of the *First Principles* and also of *Principles of Sociology*. Whether it be a question of stars, plants, or men, all things move, according to him, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Differentiation is the inexorable law of nature as well as at the same time the indispensable condition of human progress. Would it not be justifiable to draw from this, the inference that the social orders conforming most closely to nature are those which divide societies into specialized groups, closed to one another, constituted as so many distinct organisms; in short, caste systems? Spencer himself, convinced individualist industrialist, would have repudiated this inference. But it has happened more than once that conclusions have been deduced from a system which were contrary to the feeling of its author. Did this not happen to Darwin, the gentle botanist, the least aggressive of men, who nevertheless, in making clear the necessity of the struggle for existence, became the sponsor of innumerable warlike theories? Active competition and universal differentiation—two themes put forward by English philosophy for the consideration of the modern world, and which have been used as grounds for turning aside from the rationalistic tendency, at once democratic and internationalist, which we would evoke.

Several French thinkers have taken their position midway between these points of view of the evolutionist philosophy. Among those who have measured its importance for Sociology, let us quote Gabriel Tarde and André Lalande. Gabriel Tarde, author of *Lois de l'Imitation*, wrote also *L'Opposition universelle*, in which he disputes the statement that everything can be explained by the virtues of competition; he regards as more fruitful those of what he calls "*convivance*." Mistrusting alike the laws of differentiation and the struggle for existence, he sketches a theory of universal repetition: repetition, propagator of movement at the stage of matter, becomes heredity at the stage of life and imitation at the stage of society; and by virtue of imitation, likenesses cannot fail to gain on differences.

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We find, again, an analogous tendency in the work of our colleague, M. Lalande, whose thesis, first presented under the title, *L'idée directrice de la Dissolution, opposée à celle de l'Evolution, dans la Méthode des Sciences physiques et morales*, has been republished with a new title, *Les Illusions évolutionnistes*. That is to say, he challenges directly the Spencerian theories. While he concedes to them some truth so far as they refer to living organisms, where, so to speak, one may see distinct organs appearing, he denies that the law is verified either above or below the level of life. In the physical world the truth is not with Spencer but with Cournot. In action, energy is dissipated, inequalities reduced, differences effaced. One might say that the material world levels itself out. In fact, it is *involution* rather than evolution of which we should here speak. Similarly, in the social order, which tends more and more to become a rational order, barriers are lowered, open groups take the place of closed groups, communications and exchanges increase and make a way for resemblances, whose progress permits the establishment of societies of a contractual type. Human reason, then, should be capable of reuniting with inorganic nature, above the level of animal life.

M. Lalande's thought here corresponds with that of Cournot, who in the summary of his work, *Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisme*, was the first among us to show in what sense the laws of reason, by making for uniformity, are nearer to the laws of matter than to those of life. We have here, in fact, the very opposite of the Spencerian theories. It is towards a philosophy of assimilation and not of differentiation that we are led.

Let us note here the attitude taken towards this question by the master of our sociological school, Emile Durkheim. At first sight, it might seem that he was nearer to Spencer. Does he not attribute major importance to the division of labour, the irreducible and indispensable condition of the transformation of our industrial societies? And M. Lalande

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does actually accuse Durkheim of conceding too much to biomorphic analogies, and of supposing that there are in societies distinct organs analogous to those which are formed in organisms. But it is necessary to distinguish very clearly—to overlook this distinction would lead to the most serious ambiguities—between specialization of function and differentiation properly so called, leading to the formation of separate organs. Durkheim, for his part, was under no misconception as to this distinction. That specialization is increasing in human societies by no means proves that they should divide themselves into closed groups. Groups of this kind are the rule in India, the land blessed with castes. But in our Western societies, countries of large-scale industry, specializations a hundred times more intensive than those of classical India have developed, without, however, maintaining walls such as she has erected between her groups. What is more, specialization of the Western kind only produces the results contemplated if attention is paid to the varying aptitudes of individuals and scope is given for their expression. This Durkheim shows to be necessary in the latter part of his thesis, where he reminds us that a healthy organization of the division of labour requires equality in the possibilities of development, equality of opportunity for individuals. That is to say, division of labour, according to Durkheim, far from having to adapt itself to a caste system, is on the contrary compatible with democracy. In fine, a differentiation leading to the formation of distinct groups, separate like organs, seems to be neither a universal law of nature nor an indispensable condition of social progress.

But even though in the economic and social fields division of labour does not necessarily carry with it differentiation, may it not be that, all theory apart, differentiation occurs in other fields?

Underlying all human societies there are facts of a biological order which must be taken into account. Men are living beings of various types, of which the characteristics

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are transmitted by heredity. They constitute, in a word, distinct races. To take into account these race-differences and to maintain them at all costs: might not that be a condition of human progress which is too often forgotten?

According to some doctrines, it is true, races are unequal and should remain distinct. There are those who alone are privileged to produce, to secrete one might say, a superior civilization. At all events, mixed races within a nation can do so only slowly. Purity of race is the first condition of the health of nations. Such are the theories advanced by the Frenchman Gobineau and the Englishman Chamberlain, theories which have met with their well-known success in Germany and which contribute to the formation of the soul of Nazism, a soul swollen with scorn and anger. Racialism has become a kind of gospel of the new time, a gospel for which men would be prepared to fight.

Violently opposed at all times to all forms of humanitarianism, the exaggerations found in these theories have, from the scientific point of view, been long denounced. No one denies either the diversity of human types or that these types are maintained by heredity. There is great interest in studying the characteristics of these varieties of distinct human types, distinct not only by colour or by the form of the head or nose, but also by the composition of the blood, respiratory frequency, arterial pressure, etc.

The works most recently published in France on this subject, those of MM. Lester and Millot on *Races humaines*, or the chapter written by M. Neuville on *Races et Peuples* in Volume X of *L'Encyclopédie française*, present a mass of documents quite invaluable to science.

What seems hardly scientific is firstly, the pretension of claiming for one of these races a sort of monopoly of superior culture. In the most diverse races are men who have made most valuable contributions to the heritage of civilization. But secondly, and more important, and with small claim to be scientific, is the assumption that these races should be

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considered as species between which crossing would be impossible, or in any case dangerous.

Gobineau deplored intermixture and denounced the deplorable effects of cross-breeding. The discussion still goes on. It is possible that among human beings the inferiorities of half-castes, if they can be proved, owe more to the social situation than to biological constitution. And why, with human beings, should it not be possible to count on the phenomena of enrichment and rejuvenation by crossing to which the naturalists have drawn our attention? With animal species, the theory of degeneration by crossing is now opposed by that of hybrid vigour.

In any case, whether we like it or not, these mixtures of race in human societies appear to be inevitable, and as M. Pittard, among others, showed long ago, no nation can boast of being pure. In France we know this better than elsewhere, since our nation is perhaps more mixed than any other in the world; do we not find there Iberians, Ligurians, Germans, Normans, Basques, Slavs, Phoenicians, and even Saracens? Since the Quaternary Epoch, variety on our soil has been the rule, brachycephalics have been found together with dolichocephalics; every period of history has brought new influxes without in the least preventing France from building up, and even more rapidly than any other country, a unified nation. The nation which is the most diversified ethnically is also the one which has become the most rapidly and firmly unified.

It may be said that although the race is not the antecedent of the nation, yet it follows it; that men living together under one law will gradually develop distinct ethnic types which merit the name of races.

This, it seems, is the position of M. Gumplowicz and of M. Petrescu. We may grant some truth to their theory provided we make clear the distinction between biological races and historical races. This latter term, the use of which has introduced many ambiguities into history, would corre-

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spond to a type of culture which is handed on from generation to generation; but it is important to insist that it is not transmitted by heredity alone, nor is it determined by anatomical constitution alone.

Racialism seems to imply a kind of materialism which is, logically enough, repugnant to sociology: if carried to its limit, it would render sociology useless. Everything in societies would be explained by reference to the physical, organic, and mental characters of the individuals of which they are constituted. But in fact, as can be seen in many instances, tradition perpetuates itself without being incarnated in any organism. Education understood *lato sensu*, the action of the environment on the individual, completes, and in some cases limits, the action of heredity. To speak of a heritage is not necessarily to speak of organic transmission. Auguste Comte, great partisan of the continuity of history, saw this clearly; remarking that a society is composed more of the dead than of the living, he is far from believing that the dead act in us through the biological heritage that they hand on to us. The heritage of ideas, sentiments, customs, which make up civilizations is not carried down from generation to generation merely by physical continuity ; those ideas, etc., are the extra-organic heritage, whose modes of formation and transmission it rightly belongs to sociology to study. By this road we reach again the famous formula dear to Renan: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle."

Is it necessary to say that at least these national unities, once formed, tend to maintain themselves as distinct unities, and that this distinction, which allows to each a rôle and, as it were, a mission to fulfil, is a general condition of the progress of civilization itself? We are reminded here of the nationalist theory which Fichte emphasized with so much vigour in his *Discours à la Nation allemande*. Beyond doubt, the tendency of nations in the process of formation is to set themselves in opposition to others; nationality, at least, seems destined to distinguish while it unites. A group, while be-

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coming aware of the similarities which unite its members, becomes also conscious of the differences which separate them from the members of another group, and this moral frontier is often more difficult to break through than the material frontier.

M. van Genepp, in his comparative treatise on nationalities, reviewing the common traits characteristic of a nationality, from tattooing to costume, from national flags to the types of the roofs, from the structure of words to the tendencies of culture, rightly remarks that we have here what he calls "*symboles de differentiation.*" Further, members of nations are often moved by the feeling that in order to maintain and develop the particular culture, which is, as it were, the soul of this body of traditions, they must jealously isolate themselves, protect themselves from intellectual contamination. National cultures require closed doors.

As a matter of fact, whether we fear it or not, contamination and collaboration are found everywhere. No one can doubt that above national cultures wider civilizations grow up, which include overlapping similarities not only in ways of doing things but in ways of thinking. A whole programme of international sociology could be drawn up to study the development of these common civilizations in their many aspects, not only in religion but also in science; not only in technical achievements but also in the fine arts. Only the fact that national sentiment, which keeps guard over particular cultures, manifests such an extraordinary strength prevents the coming of a new order. In the last great war, as M. Elie Halévy has shown, its strength was such that all opposition, whether of the Catholic Church or the workers' syndicates, was swept away like straw; and at the present time, notwithstanding the experiences of the war, it seems certain that anxiety for national unity and independence is the main force with which politicians must reckon:

It could be maintained that at least these national unities render a service, perform a function; they prevent the

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aggravation of internal differentiations, which threaten to become world-wide differentiations, namely, those which result from classes. Here we come up against Marxism. Has not Marx declared that the proletariat has no fatherland; has he not warned us that the gulf between the haves and have-nots will be widened into an abyss?

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, assessing the consequences of the industrial revolution, an English statesman, Sir Robert Peel, expressed his view that the progress of industry would create a new race of men: not a race in the precise meaning of the word, but a group, clearly enough distinguished from the rest of society; distinct not only in the rôle which it plays or the place which is assigned to it in society, but by its standard of life, by its manner of life, and finally by its conception of life.

In his book on the working class and the standard of living, M. Halbwachs, comparing the budgets of factory workers with the budgets of other workers, and noting in what way their expenses were apportioned, observed that the factory workers seemed to spend much less than the other classes on rent. This to him signified a kind of "desocialization," itself produced by habits of life imposed on more or less mechanized workers by their place in production. At the limit it would justify us in speaking of two antagonistic worlds.

And yet, since Marxism announced the growth of this new form of differentiation, it has been possible to show that within a single nation, between the different classes, many common attitudes subsist, and that many national, religious, political, and moral traditions live in the hearts of the workers as well as in the hearts of the bourgeoisie. Class barriers do not preserve the insurmountable height attributed to them. Ascent is still possible, both collectively and individually. It is no doubt true that the time is past when amongst the captains of industry eight or ten coming from the working class could be found, but it can be proved that in the scholastic organiza-

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tions of most countries we are still far from providing equal opportunity, an equal chance for the development of individual capacity. The reforms which aim at what is called "*l'école unique*" or "equality before instruction" seek to remedy precisely this defect. But even without this reform a certain number of gifted children, although without means, find a way to higher education. There is still scope for what M. Sorokin calls "social mobility" or M. Dumont "social capillarity."

But, it may be asked, although some system could be devised which might be successful in raising the best elements from the masses and enabling them to enter the bourgeois élites, is there not a risk that they might sink back and again join the ranks of the uncultured? There would be barriers, says M. Goblot, which would prevent their attaining any high level. Yet, that in spite of these barriers the standard of living and of culture of the masses as a whole is rising in most western countries is beyond doubt. Do we not speak of the progressive *embourgeoisement* of the syndicates? Whether this be considered a matter for satisfaction or for alarm, it is nevertheless a fact that between them and members of the so-called superior classes similarities of attitude exist and are even increasing; similarities of manners develop with similarities of dress, and with similarity of manners similarity in ideas may follow.

One of the phenomena which work for the prevention of an increase in the distance between classes is the fact that a single individual within a nation may be a member of various groups, which are by no means necessarily professional groups. Workers and bourgeois, regardless of their profession, and, in a measure, regardless of their class, meet in many religious, political, and even sporting groups. The overlapping of these groups at one point, namely, in one individual, is what we have called the "social complication." Social complication, then, is one of the chief obstacles to the development of differentiation, using the word in the sense

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we have given it above, i.e. that which tends to create separate and closed groups within a nation. Georges Simmel, who was one of the first to draw attention to this fact of overlapping, gave to his study the title "Social Difference." But what he was alluding to was the growth of the differences which separate individuals from one another, that is to say, the development of individualization. According to Simmel, it would be possible to characterize a man, to distinguish him from others, by showing the variety of the groups to which he belonged.

A differentiation of this kind leads us far from social differentiation, properly so called. The view upheld by those who emphasize social differentiation alone prevents our seeing, in some civilizations at least, a double movement: the one towards universalization, the other towards individualization. The number of the universalizable values which make up a human civilization are increasing under our eyes, while at the same time our respect for and enjoyment of the individual qualities which distinguish one personality from another is intensified: "we love what we do not see twice."

Whatever may be the truth of these views, one thing at least can be regarded as established: assimilation is not the only force at work in the world, and above all in the human world. If it is true that two spirits contend for our destiny, against the one who hollows out abysses is the one who builds bridges. We must now see the latter at work, and enquire under what forms and what conditions assimilation develops.

II. ASSIMILATION

Assimilation must not be confused with resemblance. This latter is a phenomenon of a static order, whereas the former is dynamic, a process of transformation which also influences beliefs or theories, techniques or rites, ways of thinking and ways of acting, and is thereby active in increasing the resemblances.

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As thus understood—the multiplication of acquired similarities in individual and social life—can assimilation be shown to be a condition of association? Various recent studies, for example, those of M. von Wiese, M. Znaniecki, and M. Gurvitch, have attempted to give exact definition to the "interactions" in consequence of which men become associated. Need it be said that they can be associated only if they are in fact similar? "*Qui se ressemble s'assemble.*" But Durkheim, in representing the division of labour as a factor in solidarity, reminds us that also, "*qui differe se complète.*" This is no doubt true. Organized co-operation always permits or rather implies concerted specialization. But the specialization of tasks, pushed to extremes, may be productive without increasing the intimacy of association of those who perform them. M. Znaniecki holds that there is reason to distinguish carefully between co-operation and association. And M. Halbwachs, while he shows the worker, to use the Marxian formula, as an appendix of the machine, points out, as we have seen, that this mechanization desocializes him. Thus, a minimum of similarities would seem to be necessary for men to consider themselves and feel themselves to be parts of a single whole. The author of the *Division du Travail* would not contradict this, since, in distinguishing between the forms of solidarity, that which permits of differences (organic solidarity) and that which imposes resemblance (mechanical solidarity), he recognizes that the latter is necessary, in order to prepare the ground in which the former may work. Without a relatively homogeneous social environment, such as is constituted by the nation, specialization could not produce its effects of solidarity. It should be added, that along with those forces which make for increasing specialization, there are also forces, even in the most industrialized societies, whose effect is to maintain that community of customs, manners, sentiments, and ideas, without which common action would be impossible. Studies of the conditions and consequences of the

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development of languages, at once the vehicles and instruments of culture—such, for instance, as those of M. Brunot on the French language—are precisely concerned to show us these unifying forces at work.

Here, it may be said, we have proof that imitation retains its sovereign rôle, and that in a theory of assimilation it is important to complete if not to correct Tarde by Durkheim. Whatever may be its effect in individual and social life, assimilation is a particular case of the universal repetition which diffuses inventions. That a single gesture may be copied, a single word repeated, a single idea adopted by an increasing number of individuals, and that these acquired resemblances are effective in bringing them closer together cannot be doubted. But it still remains to enquire whether this unification is due solely to the virtues of imitation, "the key which opens all locks." May it not be that processes essentially different are hidden in the one word and that it is important to bring to light the various causes which set them in motion, or inhibit them?

In the chapter devoted to Interpsychology in his book, *Traité de Psychologie*, M. Dumas distinguishes as many as twelve "mechanisms of intermental action," some automatic, such as suggestion and automatic imitation; others synthetic, such as demonstration, persuasion, revelation; and others, again, mixed, such as prestige-suggestion or obsession. Thus, it is necessary to analyse, and to distinguish the different forms of assimilation: these will vary greatly with the social environment, and the particular relations in which individuals stand to each other. Further, their assimilative action occurs and operates usefully only under certain conditions. They also demand tendencies and determinate capacities in the individual who imitates. Not everyone will imitate everything. The reader of M. Guillaume's *L'Imitation chez l'Enfant* will see that the child must learn to imitate and that in this it is helped by many influences: the representation of the act to be imitated does not at first possess

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special efficacy : it acquires it gradually, first stimulating, and later controlling a series of experimental gropings which give direction to an as yet indeterminate instinctive tendency. But having made clear the nature of the capacities in the individual, is it not important, if we are to understand the strength of imitation and the way it develops, also to make clear what influence society is exerting on the individual from without? Whether it is a question of custom, established by long tradition, or of fashion, set by groups having special prestige, do we not always feel more or less compelled to conform? Here we meet the idea, dear to Durkheim, of social constraint, which he uses to complete or to limit the theory of imitation.

Already, on the question of crowds, in discussing the hypothesis of Tarde, where he is showing the influence of the leader over his audience, Durkheim observes that there is reason to take into account the interactions of the members of the audience and of the emotions aroused by the mere fact of their being gathered together. But a crowd is the lowest degree of a society, even if it is a society at all. When we come to societies properly so called, supported by systems of institutions, and having a network of sanctioned obligations, we may expect the pressure to have much more force. And moreover, far from always having a material form, it may be indirect and, as it were, invisible; though constraining, it even makes itself attractive. It reconciles the wills of those it constrains and obtains their joyous acceptance. It is no less true here, that assimilation is the work of an organization imposing itself on individuals.

But in accepting this conception of assimilation, are we not running the risk of enclosing ourselves within too narrow limits : limits of sharply defined, constituted societies, which have at their disposal, in the form of convergent institutions, all the means of controlling the individuals whose activities they co-ordinate? Reacting against the premature ambitions of Auguste Comte, for whom the chief object of sociology was

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the discovery of the law of evolution and civilization, Durkheim seemed to prefer that we should study, rather, particular groupings, at different levels of organization, from the clan to the nation. Should we not then be in danger of closing our eyes to perspectives which are opening up for the study of the supra-national facts of civilization?

We know the great development that has taken place where studies of this kind have been applied to history, or even prehistory. M. Frobenius, in his book *Les Civilisations nord-africaines*, is not content to trace out the bearers of round axes or the raisers of pigs in districts far distant from one another; he believes he can discover, in the materials he compares, two types of culture, the hypertorian and the equatorial, which represent two conceptions of life, the one tending rather to a fatalistic attitude, the other to resistance to evil. But nearer home, discussing facts more easily verifiable, Mr. Toynbee, in the first volumes of his *Studies in History*, observes that one of the greatest of the errors of modern historians is to take a national point of view. There is no single nation whose theory does not depend in some measure on events outside its own frontiers. In this regard, England is an island in vain: concerning the Reformation or the Renaissance, maritime expeditions or the parliamentary system, to understand events within her borders it is necessary to look outside.

We must mention that these fruitful conceptions are in no way excluded from the conceptions for which the school of the *Année sociologique* has prepared us. Suffice it to refer to Volume XII (1913) of its journal, where there is a prophetic note by MM. Durkheim and Mauss on *La Notion de Civilisation*. And again, from M. Mauss, a communication to the first *Réunion internationale de Synthèse*, on *Les Civilisations, Éléments et Formes*. It will be seen that the desire to study definite groups at different levels of organization does not in any way prevent attention being given to the facts of a technical, æsthetic, linguistic, and even religious and political order

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which are or are becoming common to many societies. These societies, though politically divided, nevertheless owe their development to interactions with one another, and live a supra-national life. Our authors go so far as to say that we have here a hypersocial system of social systems, or again, that a civilization is a kind of moral environment which embraces many nations.

What are the influences which extend or restrict these areas of civilization? An answer to this question would require all sorts of convergent sociological enquiries, not only into the extent of international exchanges but also into the relative power and difference in prestige of the interacting nations. It would be still more necessary to distinguish between the transfer of elements and the transfer of systems, and to discover how far superficial assimilation led or did not lead to assimilation of a more radical kind. Is it not for assimilation of this latter kind that conquest, important for the increase of similarities, prepares the appropriate associations? For real community assimilation of ideas is needed. This supposes a large number of cases of true conversion, of which the work of M. Raoul Allier, among others, has shown the rarity and the difficulty.

The borrowing of various elements of culture is far from being sufficient to justify us in speaking of progress towards unity of groups originally heterogeneous. The petrol can, necessary for the motor industry, is met with to-day on the most distant roads. But this does not mean that the ability to drive a car has penetrated to all these parts, much less the ability to make one. Further, even while learning to put cars to use, people of different cultures may use many tools without being brought into contact and without unifying their essential mentalities. Yet it is to be noted that in civilizations, as in organisms, there are inevitable correlations. A given element of civilization is part of a system. And it tends, more or less rapidly, to draw the system after it into the regions in which it takes root. Hence there are

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many kinds and degrees of assimilation which it is convenient to study one by one.

Researches into contacts both outside and inside Europe offer us the opportunity. Outside Europe, the experiences of colonization, which M. Wissler calls an organized diffusion, provide the richest harvest. M. R. Maunier has recently shown, in his two volumes on Colonial Sociology, how these riches may be classified. He points out that if the invader was looked on, more often than not, as a kind of demon-stranger, with whom contacts were to be refused, and against whom the native guarded jealously not only his possessions but also his gods, his customs, his ways of living and thinking, that state was unstable. On lands occupied by the colonizer, the *juxtaposition* inevitably causes relationships which are soon imitated. But *collaboration* does not come immediately (whether in the form of domination or of association); *aggregation*, which requires a kind of fusion, comes even less easily. The conflict of tendencies and the mental dramas inevitably bound up with these mixtures are seen clearly enough in the book, already old, by Paul Lapie on *Les Civilisations tunisiennes*. Having drawn attention to the three cultures existing side by side, those of the Jews, the Arabs, and the Europeans, he noted that the differences of their traditions or aspirations greatly influenced the tactics, spontaneous or considered, of the borrowers. The Jew, who had recently borrowed much from the Arab in the matter of food, dress, and the habitat itself, wished to copy the Europeans as much as he could and as quickly as possible. But this did not prevent his keeping many of his domestic traditions and his speculative mentality turned towards the future. The Arab looked to the past. Despite his adoption of many imported objects and usages, furniture first, then dress, afterwards habitat, and finally cooking, he yet remained preoccupied in safeguarding, before everything, his traditions.

Since the time that Lapie wrote, there should have been many changes as a result of which we should expect to find

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many new attitudes, not only intellectual but political. It is to solve this problem that our *Centre d'Etudes de Politique étrangère* has organized, through M. R. Montagne, director of the Institute of Damascus, an extensive enquiry into the modern development of the Arab countries. It is hoped that co-ordinated information will be obtained, not only on the economic changes they are undergoing, for example, the position of the artisan class, the distribution of wealth, and breaches in the closed political economy, but also on their cultural evolution, which could be measured with precision by determining the degree of activity of Arab speakers, the diffusion of Oriental manuals and of the Press, the number of students and of the congresses they organize. Perhaps also it might be possible to verify here the statement that there are assimilations which do not exclude hostilities, and that imitation for many becomes a means to emancipation. They would take from the West its arms, or at least its tools, in order to protect themselves against its culture.

But is it easy thus to set a limit to its inroads? And does not the calculated borrowing of hostility, systematically carried out, run the risk of changing the borrower more than he thinks? The case of Japan, from this point of view, would repay separate study. Compelled to open her doors to European commerce, she has adopted European methods to defend herself against Europe. She has armed. She has equipped herself with European tools and implements. She has built factories and founded banks. But always with the *arrière-pensée* of saving her independence and character. According to M. Lafcadio Hearn, she should have succeeded. "The Pacific Ocean," he assured us, "is not so large or so deep as the invisible chasm which actually separates the Japanese spirit from the spirit of the stranger." It remains to be seen. Since the time Lafcadio Hearn wrote, all sorts of changes have occurred, affecting not only institutions; they have encroached on the most respected traditions by virtue of the correlations to which we have referred. In

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borrowing a system, it is difficult to take or leave according to one's choice. There is a logic of assimilation which sooner or later takes its revenge and finds a way from the outer to the inner, from the body to the soul.

Nevertheless, in Europe itself are a hundred proofs that the strength of national sentiment persists, and puts a brake on the tendency to assimilation. We are only too well aware of the disquiet which the problem of national minorities has produced and may in the future produce in Europe. A national minority is a unified population within a state, with which, however, it is not assimilated, and with whose prevailing culture it refuses to be assimilated; consequently its citizens are not similar at all points to the rest of the population. Without being a nation, they are compelled to become a nationality, in the sense that they are determined to preserve their own traditions, most often expressed and, as it were, symbolized in language and religion. The League of Nations, believing that friction between national minorities and powerful states may give rise to wars, has decided that it must intervene to assure to minorities "differing from the majority of the inhabitants in race, religion, and language" guarantees against all special legislation detrimental to them, equal treatment before the law and in matters of administration, and freedom to use their own language in teaching and in the practice of their religion; all this in a measure compatible with public order in the state. Of the extent to which this legislation leaves unsolved problems, of the fermentations and agitations it provokes, an extensive literature (see among others the book of Th. Ruyssen) reminds us. Here is an incomparable mine of information for the sociologist, if he would study comparatively the forces within a single state which work towards assimilation or against it.

Another problem of the same kind will demand his attention, namely, the settlement of immigrant colonies in certain countries. In France we are now acquiring special

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experience on this subject. With us, certain types of immigrant are represented by the considerable numbers who were introduced in large groups to meet the needs of industry and agriculture. On certain points these immigrants are now becoming organized nationally. The studies of M. Mauco on foreigners in France and the enquiries conducted by M. Wlocewski with the help of our *Centre de Documentation sociale* on the Italians and the Poles indicate the importance of the movement. Until recently we had little reason to fear resistance to the gallicizing of the elements settled in France. The number of applicants for naturalization is proof of this. At the last census there were half a million naturalized citizens, of whom one-half were Italian immigrants. And of those among them who were married, one-half had made mixed unions. Schoolmasters stated that in the schools, Italian children quickly picked up the French language and culture. But will not this assimilation soon reach its limit? When the density of an immigrant population passes a certain mark, when the French milieu is saturated with foreigners, it loses its attractiveness and fusion may be greatly retarded, especially if to the effect of numbers is added that of organization, if schools grow up where the language of their native country is taught and its culture preached, if the consuls, the almoners, and the representatives of philanthropic societies work energetically to prevent the conquest of their nationals by the civilization of the country in which they have settled.

From these examples, it will be obvious how many problems remain unsolved, and how many enquiries should still be made to enable us to compare the relative gains of differentiation and of assimilation.

We showed in the first part of this study that differentiation is not at all a universal law of nature, much less of the human world. Societies are not condemned to separate into castes. Race differences do not prevent mixture. Race mixture is found in all nations, and does not prevent the

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introduction of national cultures, which in their turn restrain class differences.

It is true that intense national sentiment keeps jealous watch over these cultures and resists contaminations. But, none the less, interpenetrations are always at work. Stage by stage, the multiplication of borrowings and collaborations could be made evident, not only in commerce, industry, and technical development, but also in religion, philosophy, and art. An increasing number of values are becoming internationalized, and the circle of common civilization, intellectual and material, is enlarging. We are therefore justified in believing that with moral rationalism, which we evoked at the outset of this study, and despite contrary winds which blow strongly enough at the present moment, lie the fortunes of the future.

MEANS TESTS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEEDY RELATIVES

By P. FORD

THE preoccupation of economists with the task of working out a method of analysis has led them to give less attention to the family as an economic unit than its importance warrants. Few, with the exception of Cannan and J. M. Clark, give it more than the scantiest of references in their treatises. The preliminary assumption for analytical purposes that individuals are independent, mobile units of labour, contrasts strikingly with the practice of the State in enforcing the economic unity of the family. The series of poverty-line studies initiated by Professor Bowley and extended by others were the first considerable break with tradition in this respect, while the work of Vibart and Douglas on family allowances, of Jones, Bowley, and Allen, on the family as a unit of consumption, are signs of a healthy change. In spite of this work, much less is known about important economic aspects of family life than of other institutions of less significance in economic life or public administration. In consequence, when vital decisions on the appropriate definition of the household or family to be used in central or local means tests had to be made, not enough information was available on the constitution of the family in terms of personal relationship, the proportions of family income derived from various members, and the like.

This lack of data was the more striking because much information had been collected and lay buried in the offices of the central and local authorities. The broad effect of taking the household as a unit of assessment, on the responsibility of various relatives for distressed persons, could be gathered from the case papers of the public assistance authorities. The details of personal relationships are stated on the census forms filled in by the householder. The means

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test controversy involves questions of ethics as well as of fact, but while current ethical standards on family and personal obligation determine what kind of means test is likely to be practicable in the long run, the rules adopted by the State in insisting on contributions towards the maintenance of needy relatives, or recognizing responsibility for dependents when deciding claims for benefit, themselves affect ethical standards by reinforcing or by ignoring vaguely felt obligations.

The number of means tests or sets of rules governing the recognition of "dependency" and "maintenance" used in the social services is much larger than is sometimes realized. They are used in the major services of (1) public assistance; (2) unemployment assistance. (3) Though there is no means test, there are rules as to dependency in connexion with unemployment insurance benefit. In addition there are tests in connexion with (4) supply of milk at maternity and child welfare centres; (5) the supply of free milk to schoolchildren; (6) provision of meals for schoolchildren, (7) medical and dental treatment of schoolchildren; (8) fees payable to midwives in necessitous cases, and medical assistance called in by midwives; (9) general hospital maintenance; (10) contributions from relatives in mental hospitals, etc., and occasionally in connexion with a number of minor services, such as the use of the ambulance. Some authorities also have a scale in connexion with tuberculous patients in sanatoria. There are also tests in connexion with "special places" in secondary schools, and, less definitely, in connexion with applications for council houses. We cannot here examine in detail the great variety of tests actually in use, though certain aspects of them will be discussed later.

In the main, actual or proposed tests fall into four types, each implying a different unit of obligation and a different range of mutual responsibility. First, there is the "individual means test" in accordance with which the means of the applicant only are to be taken into account. This corre-

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sponds closely to the definition of "potential poverty" used in the Southampton Survey.¹ Instead of assuming that the income of all the family is pooled, and that all are supported out of the common fund, as in the usual poverty-line studies, the supplementary earners are assumed to be removed from both sides of the account. The effect in both London and Southampton is to add from one-quarter to one-fifth to the number of families found beneath the poverty line on the pooled income basis.² Secondly, there is the definition of family responsibility used in public assistance. It is striking that the list of persons from whom authorities can demand contributions in aid of any public assistance granted to an applicant should have been continued, almost unchallenged and without discussion, since the Act of 1601. The persons then made liable to contribute to the maintenance of poor relatives who are infirm and unable to work—the obligation does not extend to the able-bodied poor—were father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, husband, or child. The unmarried mother, the stepfather, and the wife with property have since been added. The list is noteworthy in that brothers and sisters are not included, and that while grandparents are liable for grandchildren, the latter are not liable for grandparents. Burn, in his *Justice of the Peace*,³ observes that this may be the case because "natural affection descends more strongly than it ascends." It has been suggested that the 1601 list of liable relatives may have represented what the parish regarded as the extent of religious duty; but this overlooks the fact that the Act of 1597, Section 7, made only parents and children liable. Perhaps it was increasing distress which led the administration to extend the obligation. In this case the person liable may not be resident in the family or household of the individual relieved. Thirdly, in public assistance administration a secondary liability rests upon the members of the household of any person granted

¹ *Work and Wealth in a Modern Port*. P. Ford, p. 123.

² *New Survey of London*, vol. iii, pp. 93-6; *Work and Wealth in a Modern Port*, p. 123.

³ 1776 edn.

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outdoor relief. In determining the amount of assistance to be given, both income and the needs of all members of the household, with certain statutory exceptions, are taken into account. There is no legal definition of the household, the matter being regarded as one of fact. The regulations of public assistance authorities endeavour to describe it in such a way as to pick out the group which is really sharing resources and living together. It has been variously described as the group which has a common table, or as the unit which provides a roof and a hearth, or as including all persons living as part of the family from a common larder, whether they are related to one another or not. Many of the social service tests enumerated above follow closely the practice of the Poor Law in working upon the "household" basis, though they are not identical with it. It is worth observing that the census definition of the family is "any person or group of persons in separate occupation of any premises or part of premises."

Fourthly, the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, 1932, recommended a more narrowly drawn definition which had regard to the closeness of blood-relationship. While not proposing a definite list of liable relatives, they thought that the household should in ordinary circumstances be regarded as consisting of husband, wife, sons, and daughters. Other persons in the household were to be treated according to whether they were participating members or were in fact lodgers.¹ The Unemployment Assistance Board's definition was more widely drawn and was akin to that of the Poor Law, although the extent of the liability thrown on "other members" depended in some degree on the closeness of blood-relationship.

The statistical enquiries which form the basis of this article endeavour to throw some light on the consequences of these different rules of family and personal liability, to show what is the importance of the various groups and types of

¹ *Final Report*, paras. 554-7.

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relatives in the economy of the family, and to give some impression of the chains of personal responsibility which these administrative practices establish. The bulk of the material was derived from three sources:

1. A sample enquiry into the forms of the Unemployment Assistance Board for eleven diverse areas;
2. The cases of the Southampton Survey of 1931, and a one-in-ten sample of the cards of the London Survey, 1929-30;
3. A one-in-two sample investigation of the cards of the Five Towns Survey of Professor Bowley, 1914 and 1924. In the case of two towns in 1914 the information was not precise enough for the present purpose.

We thus have information of a special group of families distressed by unemployment, and of normal working-class families at three different, recent dates. From these sources we can get some impression of what the facts of family obligation really are.

Many of the tests are based on an assessment of the means of the household, and it was the feeling that they extended the responsibility for needy relatives unduly which led to the explosion over the Unemployment Assistance Board's regulations. The number and types of relatives in the household depends not only on custom and the birth-rate, but on the character of local industry, the types of labour it demands, whether the area has by migration been gaining more than, or losing its natural increase, and even on the state of housing accommodation. An attempt has been made to ascertain the character of the household for several of the areas studied, and the results are shown below. There is naturally a small margin of cases in which the information given by the claimant or householder is insufficient, e.g. whether a child is a stepchild or an adopted child.

The upper part of the table shows the members who are bound together by the mutual liabilities imposed by the Poor Law Act, though there may be liable relatives living outside the household. The lower half shows the relatives on whom

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RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HOUSEHOLD

RELATIVES PER 100 FAMILIES

	Warrin- ton. 1914.	Warrin- ton. 1924.	Warrin- ton. U.A.B.	Bourne- mouth. U.A.B.	Reading. U.A.B.	Hudders- field. U.A.B.	London (N.E. Outer).	London (S.E.).	South- ampton. 1931.
Female heads	4·1	6·2	2·0	9·8	1·1	1·2	5·4	10·7	5·9
Male heads	95·9	93·8	98·0	90·2	98·9	98·8	94·6	89·3	94·1
Wives	84·2	83·3	77·6	73·9	76·4	87·1	85·9	81·8	85·3
Sons and daughters	244·5	245·6	203·3	187·6	170·8	206·4	189·5	172·3	198·6
Fathers	4·1	3·7	3·6	3·9	6·7	2·9	3·0	—	4·3
Mothers	11·6	8·7	8·5	7·9	12·4	6·4	5·9	4·9	11·8
Grandparents	0·3	0·6	—	0·7	—	—	0·7	—	—
Grandchildren	0·3	4·8	2·4	3·9	—	1·2	1·0	1·3	1·6
Brothers	9·9	5·2	8·9	5·9	24·8	1·8	3·0	1·3	3·9
Sisters	8·9	6·6	9·8	7·2	12·4	5·3	4·5	2·2	4·1
Nephews and nieces	1·4	6·0	2·4	2·0	3·4	1·2	1·3	0·4	2·9
Uncles and aunts	—	0·6	—	1·3	1·1	—	0·3	—	1·2
Cousins	—	1·4	—	—	—	—	—	—	0·2
Fathers-in-law	0·7	3·3	2·0	—	1·1	1·2	—	—	1·3
Mothers-in-law	1·7	4·8	1·6	1·3	1·1	0·6	1·0	0·4	2·0
Sons-in-law and Daughters-in-law	0·3	5·0	0·8	—	—	—	1·0	—	0·4
Brothers-in-law	0·7	5·0	2·0	—	—	1·2	1·0	—	2·0
Sisters-in-law	0·3	5·4	—	—	—	1·2	0·3	0·9	0·5
"Grandparents-in- law".	—	0·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Housekeepers	0·3	0·2	0·8	1·3	1·1	2·3	0·3	—	—
Housekeepers' chil- dren	—	1·0	—	1·2	—	—	0·3	—	—
Relatives with Poor Law liability	444·7	441·9	393·0	374·0	366·3	402·8	385·0	359·0	400·0
Relatives, etc., with- out	25·7	48·5	31·9	22·9	45·0	16·0	14·0	6·5	20·1
Total	470·4	490·4	424·9	396·9	411·3	418·8	399·0	365·5	420·1

a secondary liability would rest, i.e., who would be reckoned as members of the household and have their incomes and needs taken into account where outdoor relief or other payments to one of the members was being determined. The most striking feature of the figures is their consistency. Warrington is exceptional in the wide range of relatives which were included in the 1924 household, while Reading is also unusual in the proportion of brothers and sisters in the household unit. The peculiarities of Warrington in 1924—Bolton in the same year is similar—are of some importance. The great number of more distant relatives in the household

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can be explained by the housing shortage at that date. Over-crowding was still heavy, and the household was correspondingly large. Over 12 per cent. of the population were living more than two persons per room in 1921, and still 9½ per cent. in 1931.

Such then was the kind of household which custom and the demands of economic life had created. But the chains of personal responsibility between its members are affected also by their income and their needs; and, in the case of those affected by any of the operative means tests, by the nature of the relevant administrative rules. We thus need to know the make-up of the family income, what proportion of it is brought into the family by various groups of relatives, how much the State contributes; and not least, how far each group is keeping itself, or, in the words of the Insurance Acts, "is wholly or partly maintaining" other members. The family income, considered as pooled for poverty-line studies, for this purpose has to be disintegrated. The figures for the eleven U.A.B. areas have already been published.¹

Such calculations have been made for the ten "normal" samples. During this period, not only was the earning composition of the family changing, but wages were altering, and social service payments becoming more extensive. Without giving any detailed results, the following facts emerge : (1) In Northampton, Warrington, and Stanley in 1913-14, the sums received from the social services were negligible—on an average from 2d. to 11d. per family—and were well below 2 per cent. of the total income. By 1923-4 in the Five Towns the proportion had ranged from over 3 per cent. to 6 per cent.; in the London Survey area it was 5½ per cent. in 1929-30. (2) The wages of supplementary earners, which were about one-quarter of the family income in the three 1914 towns, had risen in 1923-4 to 30 per cent. and 39 per cent. in Northampton and Warrington respectively. In Stanley, there were few industrial opportunities

¹ *Economic Journal*, September, 1936.

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for women ; the proportion remained at one-quarter. This was also the figure for Southampton and London, but there are no earlier figures for these areas. Most of the other earners' income was derived from sons and daughters. (3) Adult non-earners, many of them old-age pensioners, had small incomes which on an average amounted to less than 1 per cent. of the average family income. (4) Though not large in absolute magnitude, the income of wives of the heads of families is of social importance. In the three 1914 towns, 7 per cent. to 9 per cent. of the families contained wives with income, while in 1923-4 the proportions were from 6½ per cent. to 12½ per cent. In Southampton in 1931, it was 6½ per cent. The actual sums they earned varied greatly in their importance to the family as between one area and another. In Northampton and Bolton, in over half the cases the wife brought in more than half the family income. But in Stanley it was nearly always less than a quarter of the family income. In the Unemployment Assistance Board's cases the effect of the pressure of unemployment is obvious enough. The proportion of families with wives having income from wages or insurance or other sources rises to 12 per cent. in Reading, 16 per cent. in Warrington, and 17 per cent. in Bolton.

The significance of these figures can be readily grasped if we ask ourselves what the statement of family income would be, if made by the head on some of the various definitions of the household, actually operating or proposed. A few examples will suffice :

FAMILY INCOME, ASSUMING VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF "FAMILY"

	North- ampton. 1914.	Warrington. 1914.	Stanley. 1913.	North- ampton. 1924.	Warrington. 1924.	Stanley. 1923.	South- ampton. 1929-30. 1931.	London. 1929-30.
1. An individual means test	27/3	27½	36/5	54/7	52/5	47/0½	42/9	55/6
2. Head, sons, and daughters only .	37/9	33½	45/-	62/3	75/6	57/11	53/10	68/10
3. The Household .	39/11½	37/6	47/7	79/6	87/0	62/4½	58/4	72/6

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These distinctions are important, for although we may argue that in times of distress the entire income is likely to be pooled, and that therefore we may correctly aggregate income in order to discover whether a family is below any statistical poverty line, for other purposes we cannot assume that the total income consists of homogeneous units equally available at call to the head of the house. The Mersey and Southampton surveys showed that a substantial fraction of the overcrowded families had on reasonable assumptions sufficient income to enable them to pay a larger rent; and it may be concluded that one consideration which prevented heads of households from undertaking a greater fixed charge for more accommodation, was that the other earners and their incomes were liable to disappear either for marriage or work.

Supplementary earners are liabilities as well as assets. Before we can determine whether any members of the family on balance help to maintain its economic position or are a drain on its resources, we must measure how far their income is more than is necessary to keep them, and what amount is contributed to the maintenance of other members. Any such calculation must be arbitrary, but is necessary for administrative as well as scientific purposes. In certain conditions, an applicant for unemployment insurance benefit may claim for adult persons wholly or mainly maintained by him. The desire for ease of administration has led to the use of a simple rule. Cost of maintenance is the average income per head, and all that has to be determined is whether the applicant, as well as maintaining himself, contributes more than half this amount. Suppose a family of five, including the claimant's mother, has the following income, when the applicant is in employment :

	£ s. d.
Claimant	2 5 0
Sister	19 0
Brother	18 6
Brother	6 3
Total	<u>4 8 9</u>

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The average sum available per head is 17s. 9d., which means that the sister and brother contributed to the pool 1s. 3d. and 9d. respectively, and the claimant 27s. 3d. He is therefore "mainly maintaining" his mother.¹ Many decisions of the umpire have been directed to clarifying the application of this principle to the wide variety of family circumstance. It is not without its anomalies. It may lead to deprivation if the claimant contributes several shillings, but less than sufficient to bring him within the definition of "mainly maintaining." The Unemployment Assistance Board's practice is to treat the matter as one of fact. Wide discretion is exercised by District Officers in the matter, but it would appear that "dependency" for this purpose would turn on whether the claimant had been supporting the alleged dependent for any substantial length of time, or if poor relief had been the real source of support, whether the dependent had been in receipt of enough income to cover his scale rate needs allowance under the regulations, and so on.

It is not possible to use this kind of test in voluntary poverty-line enquiries, where the relevant facts are not available. Another had to be constructed, and this was, to ask if any adult or group of adults contributed to the family pool more or less than the cost of maintaining them on the poverty line, assuming the head of the family to pay the rent. Other earners were charged with the cost of keeping themselves on the minimum standard in food, clothing, etc., and any income they possessed in excess of this amount was regarded as available for maintaining the rest of the family. In four of the five 1924 towns, less than 2 per cent. of the other earners had an amount insufficient for their own maintenance, the proportion being 7½ per cent. in Stanley; the remainder were "contributing." It is not easy to say in any precise way how largely these contributions bulk in the total family resources, since their relative importance

¹ For decisions governing these cases, see Emmerson and Lascelles, *Unemployment Insurance Acts*, ch. 15.

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depends not only on the excess sum available, but the size of the aggregate family income itself. If we state these contributions as a percentage of the family income from all *other* sources, then in the five towns they were under one-quarter of all other family income, in from 16 per cent. to 25 per cent. of families with supplementary earners.

In the current dispute on means tests emphasis has been placed on the fresh or extended chains of responsibility which they create, and in particular, upon the responsibility thrust upon sons and daughters. By using a method similar to that just explained we can make useful broad comparisons between the normal samples and those of the U.A.B. cases as to the extent of such responsibility. If a head were unable to pay the rent and to support himself and his dependents on the poverty line, and if, further, other earners had a surplus of income over that necessary to keep themselves on the poverty line, that surplus was regarded as available to help the head, and the other earners were regarded as wholly or partly supporting him. If both head and other earners were unable to maintain themselves on this standard, no question of support arose. This, though arbitrary like the other tests of contributing to maintenance, has an intelligible meaning which may be made fairly precise in terms of money. In contrast to the method used in connexion with unemployment insurance claims, it is troublesome to calculate, but it has obvious scientific advantages. The poverty line is that used in each of the separate enquiries. They are not quite identical, but it is impossible to apply any completely uniform standard, as past retail prices cannot be recaptured in sufficient detail. It does not appear that any substantial difference would be made to the results. By combining these facts with our knowledge of the numbers and types of relatives in the household, we can state on whom the responsibility for complete or partial support of the head and his dependents is thrown.

Omitting details, the results may be summarized thus :

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(1) The proportions of families in which the head was wholly or partly supported fell in Northampton and Warrington from 15 per cent. and 12 per cent. in 1914 to 10 per cent. and 7 per cent. in 1924. (2) With the exception of Stanley (5 per cent.), where the opportunities of other earners were relatively few, the proportion of heads so supported in the five towns in 1924 ranged between 7 per cent. and 13 per cent. (3) In London in 1929-30 it was 9 per cent. Southampton in 1931 was already feeling the great depression, and the proportion rose to 18 per cent. (4) In most of these families the burden was borne by relatives with statutory liability under the Poor Law, i.e. wives, sons, daughters, and parents. This was true of 90 per cent. of the cases in the 1914 towns and of 88 per cent. of them in Southampton and London. (5) In few cases was the sole responsibility for heads borne by more distant blood-relations who had no direct legal liability, but such persons were involved along with others whose relationship was closer. The proportion of supported heads who were being helped in this way by relatives free from direct liability was in the three 1914 towns below 10 per cent.; in Southampton and London it was 12 per cent.; in the eleven U.A.B. areas it was always above 10 per cent., and with two exceptions (Warrington and Bolton) was always higher than the proportions either of 1914 or 1924. These exceptions are significant. In Warrington, 1924, 36 per cent. of the supported heads were being helped by relatives with no Poor Law liability, but in the U.A.B. cases in this area, 22 per cent. For Bolton the two figures are 20 per cent. and 14 per cent. respectively. This contrast is very striking. The explanation lies in the housing situation. As indicated above (page 180), the households in Warrington and Bolton were unduly large by reason of the housing shortage. All kinds of relatives of the weaker blood-ties shared the house with the primary family, and brothers and sisters remained longer together; and thereby enlarged the household in the Poor Law sense, and were in a position in

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which secondary liability might arise. In both cases, by 1931 there had been an unusually sharp drop in the percentage of census overcrowding and in persons per room. The two towns are a further illustration of the way in which the ebb and flow of economic life in times of rapid change play havoc with the less adjustable practices of our social service means tests.¹

The relatives who most frequently contributed to the support of heads were sons and daughters, wives, and parents, in the order named, with brothers and sisters occupying the fourth place. The more distant relatives are, of course, met less frequently, but include brothers-in-law, fathers-in-law, nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles, and female housekeepers. The net may thus be widely drawn, though the total number of such relatives is small.

The means tests used by the local authorities in the various social services other than public assistance show a wide variety of type. It appears from replies to a questionnaire sent to all county boroughs, that a few areas decide most of their cases on individual merits and collect as much of the cost of some of them as they can. The rest have fixed scales of charge of some kind, varying with the means of the applicant. For the major services the unit of obligation for assessment is usually the household or the family. In a few areas the income of parents only is reckoned, as in connexion with midwifery and lying-in facilities, and in three or four areas for the school medical services. The same services are dealt with in other areas on the basis of family assessment. Where household assessments are made, the charges are varied according to income by means of scales, which may be simple or elaborate. Some aggregate all family income and vary the charge according to the sum available per head, thus working on the model of the unemployment insurance "adult dependency" calculation illustrated above. No settled principle of determining the permissible income below which the services will be provided free or at a certain

¹ For other illustrations, see *Work and Wealth in a Modern Port*, pp. 146-7.

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rate is discoverable. Some make a uniform addition to such income for each additional member of the family, e.g. add two shillings per person; others reduce the additional income permitted as the family grows larger, on the assumption that the common table brings economies. Most of them include all the earnings of supplementary earners, though a minority follow the practice of Poor Law authorities by disregarding some portion of their income as necessary for personal use. Many of them do not allow for the fact, emphasized by social survey and nutrition studies, that children are more expensive as they grow older. In those which concern maternity, infant welfare, and schoolchildren, although probably most families who come into contact with them are young and have no supplementary earners, it is often possible in many scales for earning children to have imposed upon them a secondary liability for a mother's confinement and the essentials of life of younger children.

There seems little reason for regarding as sacrosanct any of the operative definitions of liability, whether the direct liability under the Poor Law, or the secondary liability which arises from membership of a household containing a relieved or assisted person. We do not know the precise reason for the extension of the list of liable relatives between 1597 and 1601; it may have been only the response of administration guarding the rates against the consequences of increasing distress. That it continued so long unchallenged may be due less to the fact that it has commended itself to the English conscience than to the circumstance that only a small fraction of the population is ever brought up against it. The imposition of liability on grandparents seems scarcely in touch with current standards, especially as brothers and sisters are exempted. Nor does any wide definition of the household come out unshaken. Here the compulsion is not one of legal power to enforce contribution, but of placing the recipients of assistance in such a condition that the other members of the household cannot refuse to help them. Yet,

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as we have seen, the actual household drawn into liability may be due not simply to the rules defining the household—which may be thought to be the only expression of natural and moral obligations—but to the broad movements and accidents of economic life which bunch people up into large households or disperse them into smaller ones. There is, from the point of view of social policy, a difference between insisting on mutual aid in emergency, and enforcing an obligation on young earners in circumstances when, as with long-continued unemployment, there is little prospect of alleviation, or when it arises from the operation of impersonal causes which neither the recipient nor his relatives can control or provide against.

It would seem from the results of this study that the exemption of more distant relatives from liability would not involve any serious financial burden. A great part of the case for means tests rests on financial considerations. When there is much constructive work to do, and limited means of doing it, then to give more to the family with no supplementary earners than to the family with several is but common sense; but this is a matter of expediency, and the question is best discussed on that basis. For it can be contended that social forces are tending to weaken family ties and obligations in certain directions. And any means tests must take account of such changes. Neither the State nor its critics have been free from inconsistency in the matter. The former has, in distressed areas, been trying both to insist on the unity of the family when granting assistance and on the separateness of the individual members when discussing the desirability of labour transference. On the side of the critics there has been confusion also. For some of them have used the plea of family responsibility to demand higher wages, and equally the plea of separateness of the individual members where social services are concerned. A fuller knowledge of the facts is the necessary preliminary to any adequate judgment on the problem.

THE MIGRATION OF BRITISH CITIZENS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPE

By R. S. WALSHAW

IT is a matter of common knowledge that the flow of migrants between Great Britain on the one hand and the Dominions and the United States on the other hand changed its familiar direction during the worst years of the recent depression. Ever since migration statistics have been collected this net movement was outward until 1930. During the years which followed it was inward, and in the years 1931 and 1932 the gain to this country was very considerable, amounting to 42,711 in 1931 and 54,625 in 1932. The fact that there has also been a considerable net inward movement of nationals from Europe to Great Britain has escaped general notice. In this case the gain has been going on at least since 1921. It is the object of this paper to determine its exact size, and it will be seen that the gain in numbers has been sufficient to have an important bearing upon the population situation.

Figures for all British passengers entering or leaving the United Kingdom are compiled by the Board of Trade and published annually and quarterly. They are divided into two distinct series. The first gives the total number of inward and outward British passengers travelling between the United Kingdom and Europe (or within the Mediterranean). The second series refers to nationals travelling between the United Kingdom and places outside Europe (and not within the Mediterranean). As well as giving the total numbers of inward and outward British passengers, the second series of figures also gives the number classed as "migrants," i.e. the number changing their country of permanent residence. Permanent residence is defined as residence of a year or

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more. Thus, in the case of British passengers travelling between the United Kingdom and places outside Europe, we know how many propose to return to their former country within a year, and how many intend to remain in some other country for more than a year.

During each of the years 1924 to 1934, more British nationals arrived in the United Kingdom from Europe than embarked for Europe. Column I in the table given on page 192 shows the inward balance of nationals from Europe to the United Kingdom each year. The continual inward balance and the maximum of as many as 47,500 in 1931 strongly suggest a substantial return of those British residing on the Continent. It does not follow, however, that this inward balance from Europe is a true measure of the number of nationals who returned. When British nationals arrive from Europe it is impossible to distinguish between those who were initially in Europe and those who merely travelled via Europe from, say, India, Australia, or New Zealand. Similarly the passengers from the United Kingdom to Europe include a number who do not finish their journey in Europe, but go forward to countries outside Europe. In order to determine the true migration of nationals between Europe and the United Kingdom, it is therefore first necessary to find out how many nationals passed through Europe each year when travelling between the United Kingdom and countries outside Europe.

This can be done in the following way. Take the year 1921 as an example. Nationals to the number of 149,300 entered the United Kingdom direct from countries outside Europe, and they included 71,400 who were classed as migrants. This means that 71,400 were definitely about to reside in the United Kingdom for more than a year. The remaining 77,900 had therefore no intention of residing in the United Kingdom, but were merely visitors or non-migrants who left within twelve months. Most of them would embark direct to their non-European countries, but others may have departed via Europe.

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In 1921 the number of British passengers embarking from the United Kingdom direct to non-European countries was 268,300. Of these, 199,500 were classed as migrants and so changed their permanent residence. The other 68,800 nationals were therefore not changing their permanent residence, but had simply been visitors. Thus, of the 77,900 nationals visiting the United Kingdom from non-European countries in 1921, only 68,000 sailed direct to non-European countries. Clearly the remaining 9,200 must have departed via Europe. Column II of the table shows the number of nationals departing via Europe each year. The negative sign in certain cases indicates that during some years nationals entered the United Kingdom via Europe. This change in direction, however, does not affect the treatment of the figures.

TABLE
Migration of British Citizens (Thousands)

Year	I	II	III
1921	8·8	9·2	18·0
1922	1·3	6·2	7·5
1923	6·5	8·3	14·5
1924	14·8	2·9	17·7
1925	3·5	- 2·8	7
1926	10·2	- 7·8	2·4
1927	25·9	- 5·8	20·1
1928	20·1	- 5·1	15·0
1929	21·3	- 5·1	16·2
1930	26·6	2·4	29·0
1931	47·5	- 1·8	45·7
1932	16·7	2·5	19·2
1933	3·9	- 6·0	- 2·1
1934	29·8	- 8·0	15·8
Grand Total			220·0

Column I shows the inward balance of nationals to the United Kingdom from Europe.

Column II shows the number of nationals travelling from the United Kingdom via Europe to countries outside Europe.

Column III is found by adding Columns I and II, and shows the migration of British citizens from Europe to the United Kingdom.

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It should be observed at this point, however, that the above division of national passengers into migrants and non-migrants can only be strictly correct provided all the passengers carried out their intentions. Suppose, for example, a British citizen entered the United Kingdom from, say, India, with the intention of returning within twelve months. On arrival he would be classed as a non-migrant. It is quite possible that later he may have altered his plans and remained in the United Kingdom for more than a year. In that case, he would not appear among the visitors departing during that year. If this happened to any extent during the particular year we have considered (1921), clearly there would have been a smaller number of non-migrants departing than the 77,900 already noted. After deducting from these, as before, the 68,800 who travelled direct to non-European countries, we should obviously be left with a figure smaller than the 9,200 of Column II for those departing to non-European countries via Europe. All changes of intention from non-migrants to migrants would therefore diminish column II of the table.

On the other hand, suppose a British national entered the United Kingdom from India with the intention of remaining for more than a year. He would be classed as a migrant. But he may subsequently have changed his plans and returned to India within twelve months. In doing so he would change from a migrant to a non-migrant. If this happened in 1921, clearly more non-migrants would depart than the 77,900 nationals mentioned above. On subtracting the same 68,800 who sailed direct to non-European countries, we should get this time a larger figure than 9,200 for those departing via Europe. All changes of intention after arrival in the United Kingdom from migrants to non-migrants would therefore increase Column II of the table.

Thus, changes of intention from non-migrants to migrants would decrease Column II, whereas changes from migrants to non-migrants would increase Column II. It seems very

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probable that both would happen to some extent. But during the particular period under consideration there is no apparent reason why more migrants should have become non-migrants than vice versa. We therefore proceed on the assumption that, especially over a period of years, the number of nationals who, after arrival, changed from migrants to non-migrants was about equal to the number who changed from non-migrants to migrants. In this case, of course, their effects on Column II would nullify each other.

Very probably many of the British citizens appearing in Column II travelled across Europe in order to break their journey and spend some time there. It appears from Column II that the movement across Europe reached a minimum in 1931. This was no doubt owing to the fact that this country abandoned the Gold Standard in that year and the rate of exchange on the Continent reached its most adverse point for the whole of the period considered. Column II had its maximum numerical value of 9,200 in 1921. The direction of this maximum movement is significant. It was from the United Kingdom via Europe to countries outside Europe. This is in accordance with what we know usually happens. Rather than break their homeward journey, British citizens visiting the United Kingdom from, say, India, more often come home first and then dawdle on the Continent on their return journey.


In 1921 the 9,200 nationals of Column II who departed via Europe for countries outside Europe were included among the passengers from the United Kingdom to Europe. Obviously they would cause the inward balance from Europe, given in Column I, to be smaller than it would be otherwise. But in spite of these extra 9,200 travelling from the United Kingdom to Europe, there was still an inward balance of 8,800. So it becomes evident that the true migration of nationals from Europe to the United Kingdom in that particular year was 18,000. Column III therefore adds together Columns I and II and shows the true migration of British

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citizens from Europe to the United Kingdom during each of the years 1921 to 1934. The graph below shows how the movement varied from year to year.

Before considering the significance of these results there is an important point which we must bear in mind. In order for a non-migrant to carry out his intention, he must leave the United Kingdom within twelve months after his entry. But clearly his departure need not necessarily occur during the same calendar year as his arrival. It may take place in

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the following calendar year. Thus, our yearly figures for visitors may be rather misleading. If the time spent in this country by non-migrants varied considerably from one year to the next, the yearly figures for non-migrants (and hence the final yearly migration figures arrived at in Column III) would be subject to modification. But no matter how the early figures may have been affected, it is evident that over a number of years, any variations in the duration of visits could not have altered the total number of non-migrants entering and departing. Thus, the grand total of Column III is quite independent of how long each non-migrant stayed in this country. But although the total migration for the whole period is not affected by the changes in the duration of visits, we must nevertheless not regard the yearly fluctuations as exact.

The graph shows that, except for the one year 1933,

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British citizens on the Continent of Europe have been continually returning to the United Kingdom at least since 1921. The annual movement has varied widely from fewer than 1,000 in 1925 to more than 45,000 in 1931. British residing on the Continent may be divided into two classes. There are those who live there for business reasons, and there are those with sufficient means who reside there simply because they prefer to do so. It is probable that the British nationals returning from Europe between 1921 and 1934 included members from both these groups.

It is well known that during the last ten years there has been a large decrease in foreign trade. This suggests that the bulk of the British immigration from Europe may have consisted of the former class, i.e. the business men. From the point of view of foreign trade, 1925 was considered a good year. The value of United Kingdom produce exported to foreign countries was £438,266,540. The graph shows that during 1925 the return of British citizens from Europe almost ceased. After 1925, however, the value of United Kingdom produce exported to foreign countries was never equally large. Indeed, the decline after that year was so marked that by 1933 the value stood at only £204,391,789—a figure less than one-half of that already noted for 1925. Exactly the same may be said about the imports received by the United Kingdom from foreign countries, and the re-export from the United Kingdom to foreign countries of imported merchandise. The total imports received from foreign countries fell from £891,579,013 in 1925 to £425,878,796 in 1933; the re-export to foreign countries of imported goods fell from £127,737,234 in 1925 to £38,638,069 in 1933. It is very evident that during such a period, many representatives of British firms must have been withdrawn from the Continent.

With regard to the leisured British residing on the Continent, their return may have been caused at times by the fear of war and the general political unrest in certain parts

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of Europe. But the principal factor bringing about their return has undoubtedly been the occurrence of adverse rates of exchange. This explains why the graph reaches the peak in 1931. When the United Kingdom abandoned the Gold Standard in that year, the £ quickly fell from 123·97 francs on the 29th September to 84·146 francs on the 12th December. British nationals on the Continent suddenly encountered a very unfavourable rate of exchange and they returned to this country in large numbers.

This abnormal influx coming at the end of ten years' prolonged migration resulted in the total return of about 204,000 British nationals from Europe between 1921 and 1932. The sudden fall of the graph to zero in 1933 would almost suggest that very few remained there. But this could hardly have been so, as the movement started again in 1934 with the further return of some 16,000. Thus, during the fourteen years 1921 to 1934, the total gain in numbers by the United Kingdom owing to the return of British citizens from Europe was about 220,000.

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BOOK REVIEWS

INTELLECTUALS AND EARLY LIBERALISM

DIE SOZIALGESCHICHTLICHE LAGE DER BURGERLICHEN INTELLIGENZ UM DIE WENDE DES 18 JAHRHUNDERTS. By P. H. Gerth, 1936.

The stormy period during the fifty years around 1800 offers many fruitful suggestions for approaches to contemporary history. In Dr. Gerth's *Die Sozialgeschichtliche Lage der Bürgerlichen Intelligenz um die Wende des 18 Jahrhunderts*, an analysis of Early Liberalism and the Intellectuals in Germany, there are two leading ideas.

I

The first originates as a methodological device for dealing with the integration of various strata into a general social movement and of their social aspirations into one political outlook. Dr. Gerth maintains that liberal thought arose from the most diverse social sources. The sociological problem for him is to discover those aspects of the situation of each stratum which led potentially towards liberalism and which consequently could be integrated to form the early liberal movement.

These potentially integrating aspects are called "points of coincidence." They may be either social, as in the endeavours of the state officials and of the trading middle class to achieve a stable and uniform legal system; or ideal, as in the spread of ideas of liberty among various strata including the intellectuals.

The landed nobility were potentially interested in removing traditional relationships in production and state regulation of marketing. The introduction of the profitable eighteenth-century technical improvements in agriculture necessitated the freeing of the serfs—incidentally supplying the free labour required by early capitalism. As periodic exporters of grain the nobility wanted free trade. The princes also promoted the new agricultural methods, which increased the value of their land and its taxable capacity.

Civil servants became increasingly dislodged from their family ties—and consequently also those of rank—as the service acquired the characteristics of a profession. The resulting dependence of success on individual performance was a standard belonging to the future society. They realized more and more their importance as trained administrators. In their endeavours to remove the legal insecurity of their own appointment—their dependence on the favour of princes—they could easily identify themselves with the wider movement seeking to establish the rule of law. They desired the unification of law throughout the state

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and its systematization on grounds of administrative simplicity and also in order to be able to secure promotion in any part of the state. The administrative argument weighed also with the princes. These were all points of coincidence with the demand of the growing commercial middle class for stable and uniform law as a precondition for extending the markets; and they could be strengthened by the predominance of the middle classes among the persons with whom most civil servants had dealings.

The Protestant clergy always had close connexions with the middle class, especially of the towns. There was mutual recruitment from each other's ranks, and in particular the clergy were interested in obtaining more openings for their sons in commercial and similar positions. Then contact with the universities was another channel along which liberal ideas could reach them.

Professors, just as other civil servants, wanted to remove the uncertainty of their tenure and obtain full scope for advancement by abolishing such restrictions as the prohibition of migration from state to state. The students also were outgrowing the limitations of the traditional order, in regard to their academic life and future professional outlook as well as the ideas they were acquiring. The period under review was one in which new universities were founded and old ones enlarged. The princes fostered this because of the prestige it brought them and also on mercantilistic grounds because students brought money into the state. This expansion was accompanied by a rise in the social standing of the professors, thus increasing the influence of a potentially liberal element. The migrations of professors and students contributed to the breaking down of state particularism. The intellectuals were thus a strong element in the growth of *national* feeling, in this way becoming the natural allies of the growing commercial and industrial interests. Their horizontal bonds throughout Germany cut through the rigidity of feudalism and state particularism.

Foremost in the general attack on guild exclusiveness and privilege and on all hindrances to trade and communication was the emerging capitalist element. "The decisive stratum for liberalism, however, was the capitalist business man who replaced the domestic system by the factory."

The employment of the technique of points of coincidence would seem to imply a methodological precondition, actually present in Dr. Gerth's case. It is, namely, essential to know the purpose for which various social situations are potentially coincident. This means knowing the general movement into which the aspirations of various strata may be integrated. The recognition of a general historical direction is necessary for the analysis of the special importance of particular social groupings,

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for there may be a host of "similarities" of no historical relevance. And the selection of historically relevant phenomena distinguishes a sociological treatment from a mere *post-factum* recording of events. If it is to be of value, sociological "coincidence" must be something much more than that series of coincidences which some would have us believe constitutes history; i.e. coincidence is a methodical device for the further elucidation of actual and potential group-relationships on the basis of well-founded historical hypotheses and not a judgment concerning the manner in which these relationships arise.

The period studied does seem to lend itself particularly to the employment of this technique. For one of the chief problems of such a period of transformation is precisely how widespread local initiative is knit together to form a movement which eventually transforms the whole of society. In times when every stratum has to reorientate itself and find some kind of *modus vivendi* in the emerging social order or else perish, it seems that polarization towards two sides based on points of coincidence and a disappearance of the middle positions is a general phenomenon. The practical political problem arising from this circumstance is that the immediate alignment is not predetermined, because there is no 100 per cent. coincidence between the demands of any two strata. Rather there is a choice of different aspects of their various situations, any of which may eventually become the politically determining factor. The theoretical problem lies in the study of these different aspects, particularly as they affect the future of the strata concerned.

A distinction of great historical importance arises from the partial or more complete identification of a stratum with the aims of the movement as a whole. In our case the industrial and commercial middle class was in a position to identify itself most fully with early liberalism, whereas all the others found important impediments and reservations.

II

The second leading order in Dr. Gerth's study is the special importance of the intellectuals in early German liberalism. "It remains characteristic for the first phase that all the spokesmen of liberalism attained their viewpoint via the academic intelligentsia, that that stratum of genuine business men, whose advocates entered the political struggle in the 'twenties and 'thirties, was not yet vocal."

The situation of the intellectuals is examined in detail in regard to their social origin, education, professional prospects, and political influence. In all these respects their facilities for creating political ferment were very considerable. They were recruited from nobility and middle class, town and country, civil service and clergy. The future bourgeois intelligentsia was by no means all middle class in origin.

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Its crystallization into a stratum also reflected the disintegration in the aristocracy, both structurally—desertion of members—and in its historical implication—the legitimacy of rational critical examinations of society—which was inimical to the old order.

After their university study they had numerous opportunities of spreading the new ideas they had acquired. Apart from being distributed among influential families as private tutors, openings as teachers were growing because "education became the hall-mark of the intellectually leading stratum of the middle class."

The growth of the Press and in the number of writers is particularly significant. It is estimated that there were 3,000 writers in Germany in 1773 and 6,000 in 1787. The number of new books published annually doubled between 1770 and 1800. The contents of the daily Press showed a growing inclination towards political topics.

Two problems arise here: the rôle of intellectuals in the liberal movement generally, and their special position in Germany in view of the retardation of liberalism in that country.

The association of the intellectuals with early capitalism seems in the first place to be one based on common aims; in the desire for freedom of movement, communication, and speech and for the rule of law, they were united against a common enemy. But beyond that there appears to be a relationship of causal interdependence, in so far as capitalism created the technical and social basis for a large intellectual stratum. More efficient printing and improved communications made possible the distribution of their products; commercial and similar occupations provided a recruiting-ground as well as alternative careers for intellectuals. Conversely also capitalism required educated persons as practical scientists and as clerks—an occupation of comparatively high standing in those days.

This intimate association is shown in that recurrent correlation between a large attendance at universities and economic depression, or, in this period, the hindering of individual economic advance by guild monopolies and mercantilistic political control of economic development.

The universities acted as an (inferior) alternative to a lucrative middle-class occupation. There was a consequent "over-production of intellectuals," who were now, after their university study, better equipped and more determined to wage war on the old monopolies and privileges. Thus there evolved in the universities a pent-up concentration of liberal energy, always ready to explode. According to Dr. Gerth, this over-production existed in the period under review. The universities still seem to have the same intimate association with liberalism on the offensive all over the world, from China to Albania.

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The flowering out of intellectuals may thus be due to the very difficulties confronting the movement of which they are a part. This problem may be put in the form of the question of whether the periods of most fruitful social thought are those in which the greatest social problems have to be solved. In this form it is akin to the general question of the growth of human thought in relation to the practical needs of man. Regarded from this angle the association of intellectuals with the liberal movement does not appear so absolute as at first sight. It seems rather to be connected with the situation of the liberal movement at the particular period when it opened up new social prospects.

In the special German situation the intellectuals stood out so prominently, positively, on account of the above-mentioned desire for developments on liberal lines; and negatively by contrast on account of the impediments to the growth of capitalism. Much of their thought was therefore based on what was taking place in countries other than their own. Second to merchants, they provided an important means of cultural contact with other countries.

It is precisely this contrast between the flowering out of the intellectuals and the actual inability of the liberal movement to grow that makes possible an appreciation of the actual rôle of the intellectuals and the limitations to their effectiveness. It provides a starting-point for that essential aspect of the sociology of intellectuals which relates to their function in society in any given period. It is to this aspect that Dr. Gerth's study unfortunately pays inadequate attention. The detailed analysis of the "background" of the thought and actions of the various strata is not complemented by a similar examination of their significance for the movement as a whole. Once strata have become even partially integrated into a movement, important inter-relationships evolve. Each may contribute in different ways to the success or failure of their movement; a type of division of labour, especially between intellectuals and other elements in a movement, may spring up; the net significance of each stratum may vary greatly. A precise investigation of these relationships is essential for appraising the particular rôle of any one stratum.

The case under consideration—weak capitalism and temporary failure of liberalism, in spite of considerable intellectual support—might serve as a corrective to over-emphasis of the importance of the liberal intellectuals in cases where all the circumstances were more favourable. A corrective to the type of statement: "Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776, and following that his system attained such widespread acceptance that the nineteenth century witnessed the realization of complete freedom of trade and contract."

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Taken as a whole, one of the merits and services of Dr. Gerth's study appears to us to be the successful treatment of the dynamics of group-relationships in the framework of a changing society. What can be achieved in one case can also be done in relation to other strata and periods. And there are certainly far too few such studies in this neglected sphere of sociology. The more they are carried through, the better becomes the foundation for the study of political theory and for a history of socially significant relationships.

R. J. BAKER.

LOGISCHE SYNTAX DER SPRACHE. By Rudolf Carnap. Vienna,
J. Springer, 1934. Pp. xii + 274.

Every student of the abstract problems of the social sciences—whether sociology or economics or the science of history (*Geschichtswissenschaft*)—knows how important is the part played in them by those problems called philosophical or methodological. In the numerous controversies relating to those problems each disputant very frequently bases his arguments on so-called a priori intuitions (*Einsichten*) that are meant to reveal the exclusive rightness of the method proposed by himself. Doubts about the existence of such a priori intuitions have been removed ever since the time of Plato and Aristotle by pointing to mathematics and logic as standard examples of such intuition. This fact alone—quite apart from the significance that must be attributed to logical and frequently also to mathematical thinking within social science—furnishes a sufficiently strong reason for the social scientist to devote his attention to investigations relating to the grounds of logical and mathematical knowledge. Now, it is precisely in this sphere that extraordinary advances of knowledge have been made during the past fifty years—advances proceeding from different, though by no means completely isolated, origins. These are, in particular, the proof of the connexions holding between geometry and physics, established by Poincaré, Minkowski, and Einstein in pursuit of Riemann's line of thought; the modern axiomatic method as elaborated especially by D. Hilbert; and the logical calculus, the "symbolic" or "mathematical" logic represented by Whitehead and Russell's standard work, the *Principia Mathematica*. These discoveries could not fail profoundly to affect philosophical thinking in the narrower sense; for a great number of the traditional philosophical doctrines had been grounded on certain—now out-of-date—interpretations of the validity of logical and mathematical axioms, and had lost one of their main supports through their invalidation. Moreover, it became evident that the methods evolved in modern logic proved themselves efficient instruments of immanent philosophical criticism, a criticism which above all attacked a priorism. This was

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especially shown by Russell's theory of types created for the purpose of eliminating paradoxes.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* and Carnap's book, which is here being reviewed, may be considered the two most important works that have sprung from the pursuit of this aim.

We must confine ourselves on this occasion to a quite short and sketchy indication of those of Carnap's theses which are relevant to philosophy, without studying the details of the logical theses, to which the main portion of his book is devoted. Carnap himself formulates as follows the task of philosophical criticism as he conceives of it. At present the conception of traditional metaphysical philosophy as having no claim to be scientific is constantly being more clearly developed. The scientifically tenable part of philosophical work consists in logical analysis, except in so far as it relates to empirical problems, which must be referred to the appropriate science. Logical syntax is concerned only to provide a language by means of which the results of logical analyses can be precisely formulated. Philosophy is replaced by a methodology of science (*Wissenschaftslogik*), i.e. the logical analysis of the concepts and propositions of science. *The logic of science is nothing but the logical syntax of the language of science* (Preface).

Carnap takes the logical syntax of a language to mean in this connexion "the formal theory of the language-forms occurring in that language: the systematic establishing of those formal rules that are valid for this language, and the development of the consequences of these rules. A theory, a rule, a definition, and so on, is called *formal* if in it no account is taken of the significance of the signs (e.g. the words) and of the meaning of the expressions (e.g. the sentences), but solely of the kind and the sequence of the signs out of which the expressions are built up" (p. 1). According to this definition, "Logic becomes part of the syntax if that part is widely enough conceived and precisely formulated. The sole difference between rules of syntax and rules of logical inference is the difference between rules of formation and rules of transformation; neither, however, uses any other but syntactical relations" (p. 2).

Language in its syntactical treatment is conceived of as a calculus. "A calculus is understood to be a system of rules of the following kind. The rules relate to the elements, the so-called signs, of whose nature and relation nothing is presumed except that they are divided into certain classes. Any finite sequence of signs is called an expression of the calculus in question. The conventions of the calculus determine, firstly, under what conditions an expression must be reckoned to belong to a definite kind of expression, and secondly, under what conditions the transformation of one, or more, expressions into another shall be per-

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missible" (p. 4). Thus, for example, "the system of the rules of chess is a calculus. The chess-shapes are the signs (here, in contradistinction to language, without meaning), the formal rules determine the position of the chessmen, particularly the initial position of the game. The rules of transformation determine the permissible moves, i.e. the admissible transformation of one position into another" (p. 5). The syntax of a language or of any other calculus is generally concerned with the structure of possible sequences (of a certain kind) of any elements. Carnap distinguishes pure syntax from descriptive syntax. Pure syntax relates to the possible arrangements without regard to the sort of things that are to be counted as elements of the different kinds, and which of the possible arrangements of those elements have been realized in some place (e.g. it relates to the possible forms of propositions without any regard to the make-up of the words and to those propositions that are actually printed somewhere in the world. In pure syntax only definitions are put forth and implications deduced from them. Hence, it is analytical throughout. It is nothing other than combination, or, if you will, geometry of finite discrete sequences of a certain kind. The same relation holds between descriptive and pure syntax and between physical and mathematical geometry. Descriptive syntax is concerned with the syntactical properties and relations of empirically perceptible expressions, e.g. with the sentences of a particular book."

The above quotations have made Carnap's use of the concept of "Syntax" sufficiently clear to render his conception of the relation between logical syntax and philosophy understandable. To begin with, Carnap divides the problems arising from any one theoretical field into questions relating to objects and questions relating to logic. Object-problems are to be taken as relating to objects of the field of investigation, and are concerned with their properties and relations. Logical problems, on the other hand, do not directly relate to objects but to those sentences, concepts, theories, etc., which for their own part relate to objects. "E.g. in the field of zoology, problems concerning objects relate to the properties of animals, their relations to each other and to other objects, and so on. Problems concerned with logic relate to the sentences of zoology, their logical relations, the logical character of the formation of concepts in the field of zoology, the logical character of the possible hypotheses and theories actually put forth" (p. 203). "Now," Carnap goes on to say, "the name 'Philosophy' serves in the traditional use of language as a collective term for investigations of a very different nature. These investigations embrace problems concerning objects as well as problems concerning logic. The problems concerning objects relate in part to (supposed) objects, which cannot

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be found in the range of objects of the particular sciences (e.g. things-in-themselves, the transcendent, the Absolute, the objective Idea, the ground of the world, the Not-Being; further, values, the absolute norms, the absolute ought, etc.). This is particularly the case in that branch of philosophy which is usually called Metaphysics." According to Carnap's doctrine those sentences are only pseudo-sentences. "They have no theoretical content (*Gehalt*), but are merely manifestations of emotions, which in turn stimulate in the listener feelings and actions" (p. 204). However, besides these pseudo-object-concepts, object-sentences, object-problems, we find also in what is called genuine philosophical thinking genuine object-concepts, object-sentences, and object-problems: these, according to their respective subject-matter, relate to one or other of the special sciences, psychology taking the lion's share. All other remaining problems, however, including the pseudo-object-problems, are logical problems in a misleading guise. Similarly, as the supposed special philosophical superstructure of metaphysics has been previously eliminated, the supposed special philosophical point of view, from which the objects of science are to be considered, now collapses. Outside the genuine special sciences the only valid scientific problems are those relating to the logical analysis of science, of its sentences, its concepts, theories, etc. Let us call this complex of problems collectively, "Logic of science." *Logic of science, however, is the syntax of language of science.*

To illustrate and establish these ideas, Carnap carries out detailed analyses of various groups of sentences that appear "to relate (also, or exclusively) to objects, whilst actually they relate to syntactical forms, precisely to the forms of the descriptions of objects to which they apparently relate. These sentences are, then, according to their content (*Inhalt*), syntactical sentences in the disguise of object-sentences. Let us call them pseudo-object-sentences. Many problems and sentences of the so-called philosophical fundamental problems belong to this intermediate sphere" (p. 211). In order to eliminate this obscurity, Carnap translates the sentences from the "material mode of language" into the "formal mode of language," i.e. into syntactical sentences. We quote two examples of Carnap's:

Material Mode.

Yesterday's lecture was about Babylon.

Ion.

Formal Mode.

In yesterday's lecture the word "Babylon" (or a synonym) occurred.

Karl said (wrote, thought) Peter would come to-morrow.

Karl has pronounced the sentence "Peter will come to-morrow" (or a sentence of which this is a consequence).

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In this connexion, Carnap's proof that "within any one language"—i.e. by means of its own expressions, it is possible to make statements about that language—is especially important. Russell's theory of types had emphasized an opposite contention, represented especially by Wittgenstein. The conclusion of the greatest philosophical import, following from these lines of thought, is the rejection of all a priorism. For a language is a sum (*Inbegriff*) of conventions that submit to judgments relating to their logical compatibility and their usefulness for certain purposes (e.g. the pursuit of knowledge), but about which the question of truth and falsity cannot be asked at all, since they do not assert anything. Carnap formulates this "principle of tolerance" in syntax as follows: "In Logic there is no moral. Each may build his logic, i.e. his language-form, as he likes. Only, if he would discuss with us, he must indicate clearly how he intends to build it, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical explanations" (p. 45).

In the pursuit of the direction of research thus indicated by him, Carnap sees the only path leading to a scientific philosophy. The step out of the chaos of the subjectivistic philosophical problems must be taken. "Then only shall we be concerned with distinct concepts and clearly intelligible theses. Then only can we conceive the possibility of a fruitful collaboration of researches on the same problems, a collaboration fruitful for isolated methodological questions of science, for the scientific field under investigation, for the one unified science." This is not the place to attempt a critical analysis of Carnap's fundamental attitude. But even the student who cannot by any means agree with him in all respects—and this is my case—will not deny, after a careful study of the book, that it is an achievement of research of a high rank. To my mind it provides the best basis, up to the present, for a radical discussion of the theses of modern (logical) Positivism. Carnap's book will appear before long in an English translation under the title *The Logical Syntax of Language*.

FELIX KAUFMANN.

EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION. By various contributors under the direction of Edward Eyre. Volume IV. The Reformation. Oxford University Press, 1936. 18s.

This is the middle and crucial volume of what may be called a Catholic history of Europe—"Catholic" not in the sense that it has a definite religious bias, but rather in the sense that the development of the Catholic Church is a central theme, and, again, that the interpretation of history, if it is not specifically Catholic, is also neither "Whig" nor Protestant. Objectivity is the aim: *veritas praevalere debet* is the motto: and if the prevailing

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of truth is sometimes the explosion of Protestant errors, it is also, now and again, a confession of the mistakes, or backslidings, of the Catholic Church. Thus, in this volume, for example, we find, on the one hand, an account of the relations of Galileo to the Inquisition which shows him confessing himself in the wrong (and, incidentally, never protesting *eppur si muove*), but also, on the other hand, a general review of the Inquisition which condemns its use of torture and faithfully faces its defects.

Objectivity and a resolute impartiality are also shown in the choice of contributors to the volume. They are, indeed, mostly Catholic: the general review of the Reformation, which occupies nearly one-half of the volume, and the accounts of the Reformation in Scotland and the "Reformation" in Ireland (the inverted commas are repeated from the text of the author) are all written by Catholic writers, as is also the final chapter on Religious Persecution: but the central chapter, that on the Reformation in England, is written by Dr. Powicke, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford. The director of the work has indeed been fortunate in securing a contribution from some eminent scholar in several of the volumes—Professor Myres, for instance, in the first; Professor A. E. Taylor in the third (on Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy); Professor Powicke in the volume before us. Where he has not been equally successful, at any rate as regards the volume under review, is in co-ordinating the different contributions into a synthesis. The general view of the Reformation, by Professor Cristiani, of the Catholic University of Lyons, is somewhat summary, and it touches, at some points, issues which are also handled by other contributors; while the general history of Religious Persecution by Mr. Christopher Hollis, which begins with the early church and only treats of the Reformation in a few brief pages, lies largely outside the proper chronological scope of the volume.

Three of the five chapters or sections of the volume will probably commend themselves to most scholars. Dr. W. E. Brown's account of the Reformation in Scotland is based on original evidence; its spirit of *ad alteram partem* makes it a serviceable adjunct to the history of Scottish Calvinism: in particular, Dr. Brown's view of the effect of the Reformation on Scottish education (he thinks that it suffered in the process, and in particular he dismisses the "legend" of the improvement of elementary education under the influence of Knox) deserves serious consideration. Mr. Christopher Hollis's chapter on Religious Persecution has been already mentioned; and though, chronologically, it lies largely outside the scope of the volume, it is to be commended as a fair and scholarly account of a tragic and difficult theme. But it is Dr. Powicke's study of the Reformation in England which is particularly and pre-eminently notable; and the 135 pages in which he traces its history, from the mediæval back-

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ground in which it began to the Elizabethan Church in which it ended, are the essential core of the volume.

Dr. Powicke is the son of a father who in the course of a long and fruitful life, as pastor and scholar, illustrated and illuminated the history of English Nonconformity. One turns to his son's study of the Reformation with a lively interest and a keen anticipation. It is a fine as well as a scholarly piece of writing. The story is drawn from the original fountains; and it is told with a delicate feeling for the nuances, shades, and complexities of history. Dr. Powicke is eminently reasonable: he has an evident and anxious sympathy which leads him to seek to penetrate into the march and feeling of events, as they struck the ordinary contemporary Englishman: he feels himself, with an instinctive historic gift, the spirit of compromise which informed the pre-reformation system of Church and State, and he seeks to show, with the same instinctive historic gift, how readily the system could be altered without any great appearance or sense of a violent immediate charge. His last paragraph deserves to be read first: it sets out the aim he seeks to achieve—to deal with development: to subdue the discussion of theory to the task of explaining practice: not to heighten the drama (lest it obscure a just sense of events) nor to emphasize the tragedy, but rather to set forth (extenuating nothing, and setting down nothing in malice) "the humdrum influence upon affairs, as they unroll themselves from day to day before an unknown and unregarded future, of the instinctive sanity of the common man, holding fast to his life in the security of an old and established commonwealth."

This is the authentic spirit of what seems to be the essential trend of modern historiography, at its best. It involves a subtle winding into the joints and marrow of events, with no preconceived views; no external canons; no standards which are not, as it were, immanent in the actual process. The result is that history is not written in black and white: it is written in sober grey. The chapter on Cranmer, Gardiner, and Pole is an excellent example: all receive their due: all are treated with the same subtle sympathy. The defect of the method (if, indeed, it is defective) is that the landscape becomes uniform and indistinct. Perhaps that is what historical landscapes always are: but our minds, with their restless activity, crave something more. They crave an interpretation which gives light and shade, and which finds height and depth. But why, it may be asked, should light and shade, and height and depth, be given, if they are not actually there? Why should the interpretation be other than a photograph, or an ordnance map, of what actually was, as it actually happened? That takes us back to the question, perhaps unanswerable, of what actually was and what actually happened. Was the happening, in the time of the Reformation, really a sober grey? Was

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it not something rending and shattering? I, for my part, fancy that it was. Cranmer might well have used the opening words of the first number of Tom Paine's *Crisis*: "these are the times that try men's souls." They are still times that try our souls, as we look back in the retrospect. Each of us has to make his interpretation. Those of us who see black and white in the Reformation (not all the black on one side, or all the white on the other, but still—black and white) have to record what *we* see. There *was* a Reformation which was "piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, of the joints and marrow." It went down into the common man who felt it (not that all, or even very many, felt it; but it is those who felt it who count); and this common man had not only an instinctive sanity, but also an instinctive passion for something which he counted ultimate. Wherever this passion emerged, there was light and shade, and height and depth. And if one counts this passion as the great, and the greatest, thing that "actually was," and that lay behind the things that "actually happened"—if one counts it as the legacy which, in its memory and its survival, was the living past that continued in the minds and influenced the actions of the men of later generations—one's picture of the century of the Reformation will be painted accordingly.

There is one particular point in Dr. Powicke's study on which it is possible to raise a doubt, or to suggest a clarification. It turns on the law relating to heresy and the writ *de haeretico comburendo*, which lasted (when-ever it began, and that is dubious) until the reign of Charles II. The point which I should take (and it seems to me to be really taken by Dr. Powicke himself, in his note on page 412, though I do not find it taken clearly in the text) is that by the common law of England, apart from statute, the writ *de haeretico comburendo* was necessary to authorize, but was sufficient to authorize, the burning of heretics by the secular officer, after they had been tried and condemned by some form of ecclesiastical court. No statute was necessary: the writ at common law was sufficient, whether there was any statute or no. This explains why the statute *de haeretico comburendo* might be repeated, re-enacted, and re-repeated (as it was during the reign of Edward VI, Mary Tudor, and Elizabeth) without large effect being thereby exercised on the burning of heretics. The Statute was taken as merely confirming and strengthening the writ; but the writ existed in any case, until it was abolished by 29 Charles II, cap. 9. Another conclusion follows, which is also of some importance. It was a rule of the common law—both before the Reformation, and during the Reformation, and after the Reformation (down to 1678)—that an Englishman could be burned as a heretic by virtue of a state writ, and could only be so burned in virtue of such a writ. How old the rule was:

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whether it is implied in the records of the thirteenth century, or whether it was first used in 1401—that is another matter. But what seems certain is that in 1401, at any rate, Sawtre was burned "at common law" (Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law*, ii, 552); and thereafter (not altogether in accordance with the canon law of the Church) the need and the power of this writ—its need, over and above any ecclesiastical sentence: its power, independent of any statute—were matters of faith with the English lawyers.

ERNEST BARKER.

WARNING FROM THE WEST INDIES. By W. M. Macmillan.
Faber & Faber, 1936. 8s. 6d.

Of necessity, only a brief account of the West Indies is given in this little book, since it surveys fifteen colonies in some forty-five thousand words, and has space for little more than some general conclusions. Although it is entitled a "warning," Professor Macmillan does not altogether condemn the social order he describes; he sees much to praise, and finds a promise as well as a threat for the future of Africa.

The author has diagnosed, quite correctly, that the deepest ills of the West Indies spring from poverty. He is perhaps less successful in expounding its causes and cure. Repeatedly, and in general terms, he attributes the difficulties of these colonies to the plantocracy, without making it clear how they have failed in their duty, at any rate in their main task of producing wealth. In this study, Professor Macmillan entirely fails to grasp the chief causes that make poverty inevitable in these lands—the high birth-rate, combined with the evasion of marriage, and the fall in the price of export crops.

During the recent depression the world-price of sugar stood at little over £4 a ton f.o.b., to which British Colonies could add the value of a small protection in the British market. Cocoa and copra were being over-produced, coffee could scarcely find a market, and the price of citrus-fruits fell alarmingly, while most of the minor tropical products hardly repaid the cost of gathering them. All countries were affected; Brazil, Central America, and Cuba suffered even more than the British Empire. It was therefore hardly surprising that the planters pursued a cautious policy, and, for the most part, could not, if they would, supply the money for new machines. The author condemns them utterly for this; he would like to clear them away and to replace them by peasant-proprietors, growing crops for the Selling Agency or Central Factory. It is worth noting in this connexion, though, that small, separate sugar-estates, making a few hundred tons only, often came through the times of hardship more successfully than the larger factories. Barbados, divided

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among the small estates of an individualistic plantocracy, managed to remain solvent, when Cuba, containing some of the finest and largest sugar-factories in the world, was practically ruined. The small rum-producing estates of Jamaica contrived to show a profit at a time when neither the large post-War factories of that island nor the magnificent St. Madeleine of Trinidad were able to avoid a loss. It is by no means clear that the planters are at fault in the management of their estates, or that central factories could effect any economy.

When he writes about the social structure of the islands, Professor Macmillan is happier in his remarks. He observes, most correctly, that the Negro peasant is best satisfied as a small-holder owning his land, most depressed as a landless labourer on a sugar-estate. He observes the loose family-structure, whereby the women are left as breadwinners for the children, and he records the lower wages, even on piece-work, which are by custom paid to women. Curiously enough, however, he does not press his observations to their logical conclusion, nor see in them one of the deepest causes of the poverty endemic in these islands.

Jamaica, that land of small-holdings, wins something of the author's approbation. This is, it seems (were the planters eliminated), the development he could wish for Africa. In a few details, however, he has misinterpreted his facts ; thus an estate of ten to fifty acres, in that country, is hardly the holding of a white man. The "ten-shilling voter" is not, as he supposes, a "kulak" who holds himself superior to the average peasant; he is a typical countryman, separated neither in habits nor interests from his kindred, who, this year, are not qualified to vote. The nominal value of a peasant's cottage for purposes of Land Tax is £20, not £40, as stated, this tax being 1s. in the £10 per annum, representing less than one day's wages. The author regrets that even in Jamaica only one person in eight is a freeholder; but since every such household would contain at least two adults, and considering that nearly half the population consists of children and young people, it appears that a large part of the adult population is settled on the land. He seems to have missed, among his facts and figures, the spirit of the place; surely, for instance, the causes that lead to agitation in Antigua and in Jamaica are extremely diverse, while those that produce discontent in Trinidad are different from both. The author sees one cause underlying them all, but to the West Indian they appear divergent in cause and in aim.

A sympathetic paragraph describes the holding of a rich peasant-proprietor in Jamaica. The small-holder system, however, has its dangers. It would have been interesting if Professor Macmillan had been able to extend his itinerary to Puerto Rico, which unhappily demonstrates that land-settlement is no remedy against poverty and over-population.

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Jamaica has been in recent years in a moderately favourable position, largely owing to the prosperity of the banana-trade, a crop suitable for small and for large estates. This crop is threatened by the ravages of Panama Disease, about which Professor Macmillan takes an optimistic view, hoping for the production of a disease-resistant species; he will be pleased, no doubt, to learn that the Jamaican plant-breeding stations have produced several highly resistant seedlings, bearing marketable fruit, which bid fair to solve the problem.

It is clear, since these islands import all their clothing and hardware, part of their food, and, in an indefinable sense, their civilization, that they must provide exports to pay for these goods. This work stresses the fact that the value of exports per head remains extremely low. For remedy the author proposes a plan of "development"; of what kind, however, he does not specify. He accuses the Colonial Office of past neglect. The reviewer thinks that this is definitely unjust; all governors and administrators, the Imperial Department of Agriculture, and many scientific institutions at home and abroad, have done all in their power to discover and to foster fresh industries in these lands. The factors creating poverty in these islands are not such as can be removed by a simple administrative act; it is clear, even from this book, that they are still not understood. In conclusion, Professor Macmillan calls for a large outlay upon health-services and on medical work, and here every social worker will applaud his conclusion.

WINIFRED M. COUSINS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY. By W. A. Bonger.
Translated from the Dutch by Emil van Loo. *Methuen*, 1936.
6s. net.

We are greatly indebted to the publishers for the English translation of this excellent work of the well-known Dutch sociologist and criminologist. Dr. Bonger has admirably achieved his aim of furnishing us with a large amount of information in a book of very moderate size. Only an expert of the first rank, with a wide experience and an unrivalled knowledge of the whole literature of his subject, could so well carry out such a task.

The author has chosen the historical method of approach: "The present work," he writes, "will treat chiefly of the history of criminology" (p. 8), but he combines with his brief history of the ideas and methods a summary of the present position of Continental criminology. Particularly well represented are France and Holland, with Italy and Germany next. About Russia the author says nothing, and very little about the vast amount of research carried out in the United States in the last decades.

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The first-mentioned omission is pardonable, owing to the difficulties of language, and the second is of little importance to the English reader to whom the American literature is easily available. Of interest, on the other hand, is the information upon the extensive contributions made by Holland to criminological research. Other countries may well feel envious to learn that in 1923 and 1924 an enquiry was carried out by the Dutch Central Statistical Bureau into the after-careers of about 1,500 so-called "Government children" 5 to 11 years after their discharge. The value of such follow-up studies is obvious. The author, nevertheless, emphasizes that even in Holland the prisoners' personal histories are not being sufficiently made use of for scientific purposes (p. 15).

Dr. Bonger never conceals his preference for the environmental approach to criminological problems. Nevertheless, he tries not to be unjust to opposite lines of thought. As to the anthropological school, he admits, in spite of his outspoken criticism of Lombroso and his followers, that they were the very first to draw general attention to the personality of the criminal, instead of the abstract conceptions of crime in which the classical school indulged. Perhaps a little too unfavourable is the author's criticism of Lombroso's last book, *Causes and Remedies of Crime* (p. 77). To Lombroso's thesis, that the principle traits of his "born criminal" are to be found in the normal child, the author rightly objects: "Modern child psychology has made hay of this representation of the child as being either a little devil or an angel" (p. 64). It would have been especially interesting and useful to add a comparison between the Lombrosian conception and the corresponding ideas of the psycho-analysts. The author has probably avoided a discussion of the bearing of psycho-analysis on criminology because, as a sociologist, he has not felt himself equal to this task. But, as he rightly says: "Criminology is a complex science," a science the purpose of which is "the study of the phenomenon called criminality in its entire extent." This complex character forms the main obstacle in the way towards the development of criminology as an independent science and the establishment of a body of criminologists who are no longer either sociologists or psychologists, psychiatrists, or jurists, but simply and solely criminologists with a common object and common methods. Dr. Bonger himself, in his brief but excellent remarks on criminal psychology, has shown how to deal with a branch of criminology that does not exactly tally with his own scientific antecedents. We have to bear in mind that the psychologist or psycho-analyst is in no way better qualified to discuss criminological problems than the criminologist, i.e. the man who has spent his life in studying crime and the criminal, is qualified to discuss the significance of psycho-analysis, etc., for criminology.

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Of special value are the author's remarks on Criminal Statistics. He is well aware of their dangers, especially of their incompleteness. But completeness of material, he adds, is not essential so long as the material is sufficiently representative, i.e. so long as the relative proportion of the known and the unknown facts is fairly constant (p. 13). The difficulty, however, is that just this latter quality is often absent or at least doubtful. The rubric "Crimes known to the Police," has, in my opinion, to be regarded with still greater scepticism than does the author, since the methods used for this compilation vary according to the different views of the local police authorities. Moreover, changes in the substantive criminal law, and still more in the law of criminal procedure, may deeply affect the comparability of statistical figures.

The author has illuminating remarks on the bearing upon crime of alcoholism, climate, and religion. He devotes a special chapter under the title "The Spiritualistic School" to the religious aspects. His conclusion, fully dealt with in his monograph *Geloof en misdaad* (1913), states: "In all crimes, of every description, the irreligious are at the bottom of the list" (p. 129). Without attempting to question this conclusion, it may be permitted to raise some doubts as to the method used in investigations of this kind. Can the facts be obtained with any accuracy? What is "irreligious" in this connexion? Is the external fact of belonging to a certain denomination decisive? We know that it may have very little to do with true religion. Spiritual conviction, however, defies all methods of testing; questions put to prisoners are of very little value.

A comprehensive bibliography is given in the Appendix, and the diagrams and tables are skilfully chosen. A subject index might well have been provided. The lack of space has prohibited a fuller discussion of problems of treatment.

HERMANN MANNHEIM.

CASH RELIEF. By Joanna C. Colcord. *Russell Sage Foundation*.
New York, 1936. \$1.50.

To an English reader, this book will be primarily interesting as a description of methods in the social services adopted in the United States for furnishing public assistance to the unemployed. Its thesis, that as a social and economic policy it is better to give assistance to the unemployed in money rather than in goods, needs no defence in England or in fact anywhere in Europe, which has long accepted the principle. It will strike the European reader, therefore, as a strange thing that in the United States, where social work seems to have made such noteworthy progress, it is necessary to write a book published by the one

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Foundation devoting its resources to the social services to an explanation and defence of such an obviously desirable method of dealing with the dependent unemployed.

There is, of course, a decided lag between public services for the dependent and the methods of the voluntary agencies. Some of this lag is due to legal regulations, for nowhere in America has the poor law been modernized. In some places its administration has been liberalized, but usually within a framework of the poor law, based upon the Elizabethan tradition brought over by the first colonists, but further restricted by statutory and even constitutional limitations. There has been no interest in poor-law legislation; there has grown up around it a connotation of disgrace and shame that made even its administration a Cinderella among the public services.

All of this is implicit in Miss Colcord's book. Explicit are the obscurantism and the inertia on almost every side that block improvement—opposition from the constitutional authorities of the state, from the public opinion of a community, from organized industry, and not always absent in organized labour. It is worth noting in this respect that every administrative unit described is an "emergency" one; created over the law to avoid the limitations of the law, but also to avoid the connotations of poor relief.

The scope of the book is not wide; it adheres closely to the one subject of the way cash has been substituted for goods in the administration of relief for the unemployed, and that only in a few selected cities: nine in all. But in explaining, clearly and precisely, what happened in each one of these urban centres when the accepted method of giving the dependent goods was abandoned for the plan of giving cash, the anachronisms and the complexities of public social services are thrown into startlingly clear outline: how there is no national authority empowered—or even permitted, perhaps—to establish a national system; and how this grave defect has been circumvented first by loans by Hoover, then by grants-in-aid in the present administration: always with the menace of Damocles in the form of a Supreme Court decision hanging over it; how state governments as such have blunderingly, very tentatively, and sometimes injuriously entered this field in which they all have ample authority but in which none have exercised the slightest bit of it until the present depression, and finally, how each community, in matters of public assistance, is a law unto itself, with its own local traditions determining its methods, and its jealousy of state or federal dictation leading it to defend stubbornly those traditions.

Because both the federal and the state governments have perchance entered this field, and the impact of their participation has created unique

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patterns in each strong urban centre, the book will be a confusing one to an Englishman; it would be even more amazing to a Frenchman or a German. It is an exhibit of individualism in its most extreme form. But because each city had to find a way to reconcile an obscurantist tradition and public opinion to the tremendous economic and social problems involved in the dependence of a quarter of their populations, the story is one of significance of method in the social services, and splendidly told by one of the most trusted social work leaders in the United States.

FRANK J. BRUNO.

COMTE, THE FOUNDER OF SOCIOLOGY. By F. S. Marvin.
(Modern Sociologists Series.) *Chapman & Hall*, 1936. 6s.

Although it is generally recognized that we owe the conception of a science of sociology, as well as its name, to Comte, his views find little consideration in the great bulk of modern sociological literature, and the general course of the science has taken quite a different direction. The confident generalizations of the early nineteenth century are out of favour, and the science has split up into a number of isolated specialisms, accumulating great masses of facts concerning social existence, but contributing little or nothing to a synthetic view. Nevertheless, Comte had a great influence on his time, and mistrust of his too clear-cut system has caused an undeserved neglect of what is real and valuable in his work. In an admirably clear and scientific way, Mr. Marvin has now extracted the essentials of Comte's sociology and placed them in their historical perspective. The adherents of the positive philosophy have mostly confined themselves to an uncritical exposition of his teaching, and it is well to have it examined in the light of modern knowledge. In a small compass, Mr. Marvin has described the conditions under which the philosophy was conceived—in the midst of the social changes following the Revolution and of the triumphs of science in its applications to industry—and has given a lucid account of the system itself. The sharp outlines of Comte's picture of the world and of the evolution of Man were not peculiar to him, but were shared by his contemporaries. His Utopia has not come to pass, and few of his predictions have been fulfilled, but his sociology contains ideas of the greatest permanent value, often brilliantly illustrated.

The author selects three guiding ideas as the main contribution of Comte to social thought. First, the idea of Humanity, involving something more than any collectivity of men, transcending nation and race, and progressing throughout history. Next, the idea that science must embrace all things, from the inorganic to the biological and the

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social world, and that "the growth of scientific thought has sprung from the co-operation of all mankind and has tended to strengthen that co-operation" (p. 197). Lastly, the need for synthesis. It is this last idea which has made least progress. Sociology, like other sciences, has become specialized, and in the social field the mistrust of generalizations has become almost an obsession. Mr. Marvin points out that the direct successors of Comte are not the professed sociologists but rather the historians of science, such as Tannery, Meyerson, and Sarton, to whom ordered progress with time is clearer than it is to the political historian, and to whom the unity of human thought presents itself in its most definite form. With the present tendency to stress economic factors, Comte's selection of the development of human thought as the key to history is out of favour, but every student of sociology would do well to study the case for Comte's view as convincingly stated by Mr. Marvin. The circumstances of Comte's life are so outlined as to throw light on the development of his thought, and the work forms an indispensable introduction to a system of ideas which, unduly neglected at present, contains so much that is of vital importance to sociology.

C. H. DESCH.

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INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION	Jan.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW	Dec., Jan., Feb.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE	Oct., Nov., Dec., Jan.
JOURNAL OF COMMONS, OPEN SPACES AND FOOTPATHS	Jan.
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY	Dec., Jan.
JOURNAL OF THE LONDON SOCIETY	Feb., March
MAN	Jan., Feb., March
MILGATE MONTHLY	Jan., Feb., March
MUSÉE SOCIAL	Dec.
PLUS LOIN	Jan.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	Jan.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS	Feb.
REVUE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE BRUXELLES	Oct., Nov., Dec., Jan.
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE	Nov.-Dec.
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DE SCIENZE SOCIALI	Nov., Jan.
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SCIENTIA	Jan., Feb., March
SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE	Jan.
SLAVONIK AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW	Jan.
SOCIAL FORCES	Dec.
SOCIAL RESEARCH	Feb.
SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH	Jan.-Feb.
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